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Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of
Proposition 227 and the Ban on
Bilingual Education
Kevin R Johnson' & George A. Martinez

It's dump on Latino time again.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the California voters, by a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent margin, passed Proposition 227,2 a ballot initiative innocuously known as "English for the Children."3 This measure in effect
prohibits bilingual education programs for non-English speakers in
the state's public school system. This Article contends that this
pernicious initiative violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
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' Don Terry, BilingualEducation Facing Toughest Test N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at Al
(quoting Antonia Hernandez, Executive Director and General Counsel for the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, commenting on Proposition 227).

2 See CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE PRIMARY
ELECTION: JUNE 2, 1998 BALLOT PAMPHLET 75-76 (1998) (reprinting text of initiative) [here-

inafter BALLOT PAMPHLET].
' SeeValeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp.2d 1007,1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also Doe v. Los
Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp.2d 1233 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (certifying class action challenging school district's implementation of Proposition 227 on federal statutory grounds);
McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Educ., 75 Cal. App. 4th 196, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (1999) (addressing parental waiver requirement under initiative); Ballot Measures, CALIF. J., July 1, 1998
(summarizing campaigns over various California initiatives on June 1998 ballot, including
Proposition 227).
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Fourteenth Amendment' because, by employing language as a
proxy for national origin, it discriminates against certain persons of
Mexican and Latin American, as well as Asian, ancestry.' By attacking non-English speakers, Proposition 227, in light of the historical
context and modem circumstances, discriminates on the basis of
race6 by focusing on an element central to the identity of many
Latinas/os. 7
' In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Supreme Court first squarely held
that the Equal Protection Clause's protections may apply to persons of Mexican ancestry. See
Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L.
REv. 1143 (1997) (analyzing significance of Hernandez in showing how persons of Mexican
ancestry were treated as separate race); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race:
Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 321, 332 (1997) (contending that
Hernandez imposes artificially high standards on Mexican Americans seeking protection of
Equal Protection Clause); see also infra text accompanying notes 265-73 (discussing Hernandez).
, See Christopher Edley, Jr., Color at Century's End: Race in Law, Policy, and Politics, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 950, 951 (1998) ("[T]here is lurking just beneath the surface [of the
bilingual education debate] a subtext about culture, color, and race."); see also infra text
accompanying notes 129-217, 243-47 (analyzing this issue in context of Proposition 227).
This Article focuses on how Proposition 227 discriminates against Latinas/os in California.
Needless to say, other groups composed in part of non-English speakers, particularly Asian
Americans, may be adversely impacted in ways similar to Latinas/os by the elimination of
bilingual education. See Symposium, Rethinking RacialDivides - Panelon Affirmative Action, 4
MICH.J. RACE & L. 195, 210-11 (1998) (comments of Marina Hsieh) (noting negative impact
that Proposition 227 will likely have on Asian Americans); see alsoJim Chen, Diversity in a
Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811,
856-60 (1998) (collecting data showing great language diversity in United States). Indeed,
Native Americans in California, often not thought of as linguistic minorities, may be adversely affected. See Scott Ellis Ferrin, ReassertingLanguage Rights of Native American Students
in the Faceof Proposition 227 and Other Language-Based Referenda, 28J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1999). In
our analysis, we recognize that the initiative "will not necessarily coincide with color lines"
and will affect "white immigrants from Eastern Europe" as well as Latinas/os. PeterJ. Spiro,
Questioning Barriers to Naturalization,13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 492 n.63 (1999) (discussing
English language requirement for naturalization). However, language, under particular
facts and circumstances, can serve as a proxy for race, which we establish in this Article.
' We use the term "race" here interchangeably with national origin, based on the view
that race, like national origin, is a social construction. See generaUy MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994) (elaborating on theory of
social construction of race).
7 See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the GarciaCousins Lost TheirAccents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial
Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1354 (1998) ("Spanish language is central to Latino identity."); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 761, 763 n.8 (stating that
"being Latino and speaking Spanish are 'intrinsically interwoven' because in the Latino
community, language is an affirmative badge of ethnic identity") (citations omitted); see also
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) ("It may well be, for certain ethnic
groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color,
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis."); Berta
Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas - Gendered injustice/GenderedInjustice: Latinas,
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In the face of constitutional and other challenges, the courts
upheld the initiative but failed to sufficiently engage the core
Equal Protection issue that the case raised.8 In Washington v. Davis,9
the Supreme Court held that, in order to establish an Equal Protection violation, the plaintiff must prove that the challenged state
action was taken with a "discriminatory intent." The conventional
wisdom considers this requirement to be unduly stringent because
it fails to fully appreciate the nature of modern racial discrimination in the United States. '° Much can be said for this argument.
However, in this instance, there is sufficient evidence to establish
that Californians passed Proposition 227 with a discriminatory intent and that it therefore runs afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause. 1 This intent flies in the face of the debatable claim of
Fronterasand the Law, 1 IowAJ. GENDER, RACE &JUSTICE 353, 379-81 (1998) (analyzing how
marginalization of Spanish language in U.S. adversely affects Latinas/os). For this reason,
"[language rights have been a central issue in LatCrit theory since its inception." Elizabeth
M. Iglesias, Foreword:Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, Inter/NationalLabor Rights and
the Evaluationof LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575, 646 (1999) (footnote
omitted).
The Article employs the term Latina/o, rather than "Hispanic," because it "conveys an
alignment with people of color in [the United States], as well as the embrace of the nonSpanish, or indigenous elements that help to configure our present-day communities."
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword - Religion, Gender,Sexuality, Race and Class
in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 503, 569 (1998).
See infra text accompanying notes 218-24 (analyzing litigation).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
0
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now
I See" White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953
(1993); Alan D.. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1114-18 (1978); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1105 (1989); see also Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence,72 TUL. L. REv. 1065 (1998) (offering a more flexible "intent" standard to be applied by the Court); Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of DiscriminatoryIntent in the CriminalLaw, 73 CHI.KENT L. REv. 559, 551-63 (1998) (summarizing difficulties of proving discriminatory intent
in criminal law enforcement). See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri LynnJohnson, The
Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1151 (1991)
(studying negative impacts of intent requirement on plaintiffs trying to prove Equal Protection claims). For analysis of the case law and literature in the area with a particular focus on
lawmaking by initiative, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,Judicial Review of Initiativesand Referendums
in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities'DemocraticCitizenship,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999) [hereinafter Lazos, JudicialReview] and Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role oftheJudge in a PluralistPolity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 161-77 (1999).
" In a similar vein, Professor Girardeau Spann contends that voters passed California
Proposition 209, which bars consideration of race and gender in state programs, with a
discriminatory intent. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 300-14
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some supporters that the law would improve educational opportunities for non-English speaking students, a contention that
ob12
enactment.
law's
the
behind
motivation
racial
core
the
scures
This Article outlines the arguments supporting the Equal Protection challenge to Proposition 227. It is now an especially appropriate time to analyze the circumstances surrounding the initiative's
passage because, as time passes, it becomes more difficult to marshal the evidence necessary to prove discriminatory intent.13 To
place Proposition 227 into its larger historical context, Part I
sketches the history of discrimination in education against persons
of Mexican ancestry, citizens as well as immigrants, in California
and the Southwest. Part II analyzes the racial edge to the initiative
campaign, its provisions, and the disparate impact that the law will
have on non-English speakers and, under current conditions in
California, on racial minorities. It contends that Proposition 227
amounts to unlawful racial discrimination by proxy. 14 Part III ana(1997); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed Calfornia Civil Rights Initiative,
23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 999 (1996) (explaining legal ramifications of initiative); Neil
Gotanda et al., Legal Implications of Proposition 209 - The California Civil Rights Initiative, 24
W. ST. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1997) (same). The courts upheld the measure, which
was challenged on another sort of Equal Protection theory. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); see alsoVikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, EqualProtection,Unequal PoliticalBurdens, and the CCRI,23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996) (articulating Equal Protection theory based on Hunterv.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1982), line of cases that initiative created political structure that racial
minorities will find difficult to modify). This Article focuses on the discriminatory intent
approach rather than the "political structure" Equal Protection challenge. In making this
argument, we necessarily disagree with the characterization that proving that Proposition
227 was passed with a discriminatory intent is "futile." See Nirej Sekhon, Note, A Birthright
Rearticulated:The Politics of BilingualEducation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1407, 1442 (1999).
" See infra text accompanying notes 129-217. Proving a discriminatory intent is made
all the more difficult by the fact that two Latina/o intellectuals popularized by the media
have ardently advocated the elimination of bilingual education. See LINDA CHAVEZ, OUT OF
THE BARRIO: TOWARD A NEW POLITICS OF HISPANIC ASSIMILATION (1991); RICHARD
RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1981).
" See Smith v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.).

Such historical research, of course, is not impossible. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Home-Grown Racism: Colorado'sHistoricEmbrace - and Denial- of Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 704 (1999) (documenting history of discrimination against
racial minorities in Colorado to demonstrate the need for remedial affirmative action). Our
point is that such research is easier to conduct earlier as opposed to later, after memories
have faded and documentary evidence has been lost.
" Many commentators discuss discrimination by proxy. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What
Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Bias, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 149 (1992); Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 453 (1997); Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination:The Familiarand the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315 (1998); see also Alfredo Mirand6, "Now that I Speak English, No
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lyzes the discrimination by proxy concept's relevance to the understanding of discrimination against Mexican Americans and other
minority groups in the United States and contends that the Supreme Court should incorporate the concept more fully into its
Equal Protection jurisprudence.
Ultimately, Proposition 227 can be seen as part of a general attack on Latinas/os. Unlike the days of old, the antidiscrimination
principle that evolved from the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s
has tended to drive blatant anti-Mexican animus underground,
making it more difficult to identify, isolate, and eliminate. This
disturbing trend raises serious legal questions concerning the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article considers how Latinas/os may employ this constitutional provision to protect their civil rights and draws conclusions relevant to minorities generally. In so doing, we take up the
challenge of addressing practical problems in a constructive way
with the hope of "providing
intellectual leadership in a time of
5
serious retrenchment.'
I.

THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS OF
MEXICAN ANCESTRY IN CALIFORNIA EDUCATION

A full understanding of Proposition 227 requires consideration
of the long history of discrimination against persons of Mexican
ancestry in California. Although most of the state was once part of
Mexico, California has seen more than its share of racism directed
at Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. 16 Anti-Mexican
sentiment also has pervaded other states in the Southwest, particu-

Me Dejan Hablar ["I'm Not Allowed to Speak"]: The Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 115, 132 (1996) (arguing "that the exclusion of bilingual Latino
jurors [at issue in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)] is racial discrimination not
only because language and race are inextricably linked but because bilingualism is itself an
immutable characteristic"); Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Comment, Rethinking Racefor Strict Scrutiny Purposes:Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 19 HAW. L. REv. 221 (1997) (contending that, under certain circumstances, concept of "race" may include language and that,
in those circumstances, courts should strictly scrutinize language regulation).
'5 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: Past, Present, and Future, 51
CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 468, 491 (1998).
16 See generally RODOLFO F. ACUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS
107-33
(3d ed. 1988); TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE

SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA

(1994); LEONARD PITr, THE DECLINE OF THE CALIFORNIOS: A

SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE SPANISH SPEAKING CALIFORNIANS, 1846-1890 (1966).
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This Section sketches the impact of

anti-Mexican animus on educational opportunity in the twentieth
century and the changes in the California educational system
brought about because of the growing Latina/o population in the
state.
The Strugglefor EqualEducationalOpportunity in the Public Schools

A.

Mexican Americans have long struggled to ensure equal access
to education. School desegregation and finance litigation, along
with a political battle for bilingual education, have been central to
the struggle.
1.

School Desegregation Litigation

One of the most damaging manifestations of racial discrimination has been the segregation of minorities in the public schools.' 9
Mexican Americans in California have faced this obstacle in their
effort to become educated citizens. They have been litigating
against school segregation at least as far back as the Great Depression.
In 1931 in the town of Lemon Grove, California, the school
board decided
to construct a separate
cansand
eginschol
.
20 school for Mexican AmeriMexican Americans and
cans and begin school segregation.
Mexican citizens formed the Comit6 de Vecinos de Lemon Grove
(the Lemon Grove Neighborhood Committee) and organized a
boycott of the school. The committee made public appeals for
support in statewide Spanish and English newspapers. With the aid
of lawyers provided by the Mexican consul in San Diego, the committee successfully challenged the school segregation in a lawsuit.

17

See generally NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES

IN TEXAS CoI-rON CULTURE (1997);

DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND

MEXICANS IN THE

MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 (1987).

SeeACU&A, supranote 16, at 82-103.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("[Separating children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely to ever be undone.").
' Several sources recount these facts. See, e.g., ROBERT R. ALVAREZ JR., FAMILIA:
'

MIGRATION AND ADAPTATION IN BAJA AND ALTA CALIFORNIA, 1800-1975, at 153-55 (1987);
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA, IN DEFENSE OF LA RAZA 58-61 (1982); Robert R. Alvarez, Jr., The

Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation's FirstSuccessful Desegregation Case, 32 J. SAN DIEGO HIST. 116
(1986); THE LEMON GROVE INCIDENT (The Cinema Guild, 1985).
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Despite the victory in Lemon Grove, by the 1940s the segregation of Mexican Americans was widespread throughout the West
and Southwest. 2' In Westminster School District v. Mendez, 22 Mexican
Americans in Orange County, California, filed an action against
school district officials responsible for placing Mexican American
children into segregated schools. The trial court found that the
segregation violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights.23
The court of appeals affirmed, distinguishing cases, including Plessy
v. Ferguson,24 that had upheld segregation. 2 The court of appeals
distinguished those cases because the California legislature in this
instance had not authorized segregation.26
In so doing, the court in Mendez left open the possibility that the
legislature might enact legislation that lawfully could segregate
Mexican Americans. 21 Moreover, the court made it clear that, even
absent statutory authorization, English language difficulties might
justify segregating Mexican American children.28
Interestingly, the plaintiffs had urged the court to "strike out independently on the whole question of segregation" in light of the
fact that the country had just fought and won World War II,2 in

which many Mexican Americans had distinguished themselves on
the battle field.30 Although acknowledging that judges "must keep
See generally Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Project Report, Dejure Segregation of
Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307 (1972) (documenting segregation of
Mexican Americans in public schools); Guadalupe Salinas, Mexican Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the Southwest, 8 Hous. L. REV.929 (1971) (same).
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
"

Id. at 776.

163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregation on passenger trains); see alsoJOHN E.
NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 452 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing cases

upholding state laws authorizing segregation).
See Mendez, 161 F.2d at 779-81.
See id. at 780-81.
21 See id. at 781 (noting that California could legislatively authorize this type
of segregation).
See id. at 784. The court stated that:
English language deficiencies of some of the children of Mexican ancestry... may
justify differentiation by public school authorities in the exercise of their reasonable discretion as to the pedagogical methods of instruction to be pursued with
different pupils, and foreign language handicaps may be to such a degree in the
pupils in elementary schools as to require separate treatment in separate classrooms.
Id. *
Id. at 780.

SeeJUuE LEININGER PYCIOR, LBJ & MEXICAN AMERICANS 53 (1997).

University of California,Davis
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abreast of the times," the court declined to take an independent
course, stating that "judges must ever be on their guard lest they
rationalize outright legislation under the too free use of the power
to interpret. "M The court instead chose to simply distinguish the
earlier segregation cases.
Seven years after Mendez, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case of Brown v. Board of Education.2 In Brown, the Court held
that the segregation of African American children in the public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 33 In the years following Brown, the lower courts
struggled to apply that decision. In particular, they faced the question whether Brown prohibited only de jure (intentional) segregation or whether it also outlawed de facto (in fact) segregation.
For example, in Soria v. Oxnard School District,34 Mexican Ameri-

cans brought a desegregation suit against a school district. District
Court Judge Harry Pregerson found an illegal racial imbalance
within the district resulting from the board's neighborhood school
policy.

35

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Pregerson ruled that

de facto segregation violated the law regardless of whether there
was an intent to segregate. 36 The court of appeals reversed. The
court relied on the recently decided Supreme Court case, Keyes v.
School District No. 1,37 and held that plaintiffs must establish de jure
segregation in order to establish a constitutional violation.3 Keyes,
however, never directly addressed the question whether to distinguish between de jure and de facto segregation and never specifi-

Mendez, 161 F.2d at 780.
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 544 (3d
ed. 1992) ("As with other landmark cases, the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v.
Board of Education has taken on a life of its own, with meaning and significance beyond its
facts and perhaps greater than its rationale"); Constance Baker Motdey, The HistoricalSetting
of Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme Court'sDecision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 13 (1992) (stating that Brown's "new approach to attacking segregation, per se, in education had been
inspired by Mendez").
" See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
See id. at 580, 584.
See id. at 585.
17
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
m8 Soria, 488 F.2d at 585. On remand, Judge Pregerson found sufficient evidence of
intentional segregation to justify relief. See Soria v. Oxnard Scb. Dist., 386 F. Supp. 539
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
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cally decided whether de facto segregation violated the Constitution. 9
The Soria case suggests that the ability to achieve social change
through litigation may be limited.40 As Soria indicates, litigation led
to judicial holdings that de jure segregation was unconstitutional.
That litigation effort, however, found it difficult to remedy the de
facto segregation that continued to exist in the California schools.
2.

School Finance Litigation

In addition to segregation in the public schools, Mexican Americans have also suffered from relatively low funding for schools in
predominandy Mexican American neighborhoods. Failures in
school desegregation litigation led the civil rights community to
attack school financing schemes:41 Mexican Americans challenged
42
school financing in two precedent-setting43 cases, Serrano v. Priest,
and San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.

In Serrano, Mexican Americans brought a class action alleging
that the California public school financing scheme violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the
" See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 212 ("[W]e have no occasion to consider in this case whether a
'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation."); Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 912 n.10 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Since the plaintiffs
in Keyes pleaded and proved dejure segregation, the Supreme Court was not forced to decide
whether merely proof of de facto segregation constitutes cognizable legal wrong."); The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REV. 43, 70 n.58 (1974) (stating "constitutionality of
de facto segregation" was "explicitly left open in Keyes"); Comment, Public School Segregation
and the Contours of Unconstitutionality:The Denver School Board Case, 45 U. COLO. L. REV.
457, 475-76 (1974) ("The questions as to the necessity of proving intent [to segregate] ...
were ... never at issue in the Supreme Court's consideration of Keyes ....[T] he distinction
between dejure and de facto segregatory conditions was never really at issue in the Court's
consideration of Keyes.... ."); see also Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1079,
1085-87 (1997) (discussing implications of Keyes).
, See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL

REFORM AND LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw
HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

(1993).
41 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School FinanceReform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101, 123-24 (1995); see also Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (1999) (contending that education advocates should rethink various
strategies to ensure quality education in public schools). For analysis of the role of race in
the success of school finance litigation, see James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
FinanceReform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999).
4' 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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California Constitution. In particular, they alleged that, because
the financing plan was based on local property taxes, it created
deep inequalities among the various school districts in the money
available per student.44 The California Supreme Court held that
California's school financing scheme discriminated on the "basis of
the wealth of a district."45 In addition, the court held that the
"priceless function of education in our society" required that it be
classified as a "fundamental interest."'

Given the wealth-based

discrimination and the fundamental interest at stake, the court
applied the rigorous "strict scrutiny" Equal Protection standard to
the school financing plan.47 Because the plan did not further a
compelling state interest, the plan failed the strict scrutiny test and
violated the Equal Protection Clause."
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court took a contrary position in Rodriguez.49 In Rodriguez, Mexican Americans
brought a class action alleging that the Texas property tax scheme
for public school financing violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court found that the strict scrutiny standard was not appropriate because education is not a fundamental right under the
United States Constitution and distinctions based on wealth do not
implicate a suspect class. ° Applying the lenient "rational basis"
Equal Protection test, the Court held that there was no constitutional violation because the financing scheme rationally furthered
a legitimate state purpose.51
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of Serrano under the California Constitution. 2 Thus, Serrano
survives Rodriguez to the extent that it was based on California law.
In an effort to satisfy the requirements of Serrano, the California
5 3
legislature in 1977 enacted a new method of school financing.
See Serrano,5 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
Id. at 604, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
Id. at 608-09, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.

7 See id. at 609-15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-23.

See id. at 614-15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
49 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See id. at 28, 37.
'o
, See id. at 55. After Rodriguez, efforts shifted to state law to ensure educational opportunity through school finance litigation. See Enrich, supra note 41, at 128-93 (analyzing
developments in school finance litigation under state law after Rodriguez).
U
18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 374 (1976), cert. denied sub nom., Clowes v. Serrano,
432 U.S. 907 (1977).
" See William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 611
(1997); see also Martha S. West, EquitableFunding of Public Schools Under State Law, 2 IOWAJ.
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The new law sought to reduce inequalities among school districts
by transferring property taxes raised in affluent districts to poorer
districts. 4
However, in 1978, California voters approved Proposition 13, "
which drastically reduced property taxes in California by more
than fifty percent.56 The impact on public education was devastating. "Most observers agree that Proposition 13 left California
school finance in shambles."5 7 By dramatically cutting local property taxes, the initiative instantly cut school budgets, with particularly onerous consequences for Latinas/os. 55 California's scheme
for financing public schools continues to permit serious funding
inequalities between predominantly white schools and those attended by Mexican Americans and other minorities. 59 Ultimately,
Serrano created a right without a remedy. 6°
Since Serrano, California state financing for education has
dropped compared to the spending of most other states.6' In 199495, California ranked forty-first of the fifty states in expenditures
on education. 2 Financing takes on greater significance given the
perceived need for bilingual education programs.

GENDER, RACE & JUST. 279, 299-309 (1999) (discussing how Serrano was seriously under-

mined by Proposition 13 and analyzing developments in other states to same effect).
See Fischel, supra note 53, at 611.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, §§ 1-6.
See Fischel, supra note 53, at 612.

See generally ROBERT KUTTNER, REVOLT OF THE

HAVES (1980) (discussing genesis of Proposition 13).
57 Fischel, supranote 53, at 613.

m' See RODOLFO F. ACUt&A, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN: CHICANOS IN CONTEMPORARY LOS
ANGELES 91-93 (1996).
See generally Hanif S. P. Hirji, Note and Comment, Inequalities in California'sPublic
School System: The UnderminingofSerrano v. Priest and the Need for a Minimum StandardsSystem
of Education, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 583 (1999) (analyzing how school financing perpetuates
educational inequality).
See Note, Unfulfilled Promises:School FinanceRemedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1072 (1991). States other than California have experienced similar difficulties in ensuring
equitable public school financing schemes. See, e.g., Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995) (reviewing efforts of Texas legislature to ensure compliance with
finding that school financing system violated various provisions of Texas Constitution).
61 See Fischel, supra note 53, at 613 ("Throughout the 1980s, California was last or near
last in the country in terms of the percent of personal income spent on public education.
What is not often noticed is that the decline began soon after Serrano.") (footnote omitted);
see also infta notes 82-88 (providing statistics on rapid decline in California's spending per
pupil in public schools as Latina/o percentage of student body increased).
60 See Hirji, supra note 59, at 596 (citing PAUL M. GOLDFINGER, REVENUES AND LIMITS: A
GUIDE TO SCHOOL FINANCE IN CALIFORNIA 8 tbl. 11 (1997)).
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Bilingual Education

Limited English proficiency has proven to be an educational obstacle to many Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. In
addition, they historically have been deprived by the lack of instruction in Latina/o culture and history. In response, Mexican
Americans and other minorities have advocated that the public
schools provide bilingual and bicultural education.
Over twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided Lau v.
Nichols. 63 In Lau, Chinese students unable to speak English
brought an action against the San Francisco School District, alleging that the lack of instruction in their native language violated
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court held that the
school district had violated the law prohibiting race discrimination
by failing to provide an appropriate curriculum to resolve the English language difficulties.
Following Lau, in 1976, the California legislature enacted the
Chacon-Moscone-Bilingual-Bicultural

Education Act. 65

This Act

required that, among other things, California public schools must
teach students in kindergarten through high school in a language
they could understand.66 In 1987, however, Governor George
Deukmejian ended mandatory bilingual education in California by
vetoing a bill that would have continued the Chacon-Moscone
Act.67 Although bilingual-bicultural education no longer is manda-

tory, districts could continue to receive funding for bilingual education if they provided instruction in accordance with the ChaconMoscone Act.68

414 U.S. 563 (1974). See generallyJAMES CRAWFORD, BILINGUAL EDUCATION: HISTORY,
THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1995) (outlining history of bilingual education in
United States); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND
NONDISCRIMINATION FOR STUDENTS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY: FEDERAL
POLITICS,

v. NicHOLs (1997) (summarizing efforts to enforce Lau
v. Nichols). It is at best uncertain how effective Lau v. Nichols has been in protecting language minorities in public education. See Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp.2d 937 (D. Ariz.
1999) (addressing in 1999 motion in action filed in 1992 based on Lau).
See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52160-52178 (Deering 1987); see also Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education, Immigration, and the Culture of Disinterest,2 IOWAJ. GENDER, RACE &JUST. 163,
169-75 (1999) (tracing recent history of bilingual education in California and other states).
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52165 (Deering 1987).
67 See Stuart Biegel, The Parameters of the Bilingual Education Debate in Calfornia Twenty
ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND LAU

Years After Lau v. Nichols, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 48, 54 (1994).

" See id. at 55.
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The Latina/o PopulationExplosion and the Imbact on California's
Public School Enrollment

The legal developments in public education in California can
only be fully understood by considering the changing demographics of the state. California's population is the country's most diverse and will continue to become more so for the foreseeable future. Although people of every race and national origin are contributing to this demographic shift, the growth of the Latina/o
population has been nothing less than explosive. Alarming many
Anglo Californians, it contributed to their unwillingness to support
the state's public schools and to their embrace of Proposition 227.69
"If 'demography is destiny,' then California's destiny is becoming
decidedly more Latino." 70 Over seven million, or one-third, of the
twenty-one million Latinas/os living in the United States reside in
the Golden State]' Latinas/os jumped from 18% of the state's
population in 1980 to 26% in 1990.72

Current projections have

them comprising 25.8% of the state's population in 2000, 31.6% in
2010, and 36.3% in 2020,7 when they will be poised to become
California's "majority minority. "74 Most California Latinas/os are
of Mexican origin. In 1990, 80% traced their roots to Mexico, followed by 11% from Central and South America.0
Nowhere has Latina/o population growth been more apparent
than in Southern California. In Los Angeles County, Latinas/os
already make up the majority of all residents, which represents a
dramatic increase from 1990, when Latinas/os constituted about
See Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, May 31, 1998) (remarks of Professor Ra6l Hinojosa-Ojeda) ("Proposition 227 is basically a reaction against the fact that
there's a demographic change occurring in the state, and that some people are very anxious
about what this demographic change will mean."); cf Spann, supra note 11, at 312 (arguing
that demographic changes - i.e., that "whites will soon cease to be a majority in the state of
California" - strengthened case for finding of discriminatory intent underlying passage of
Proposition 209, outlawing various affirmative action programs under state law).
o FREDRIC C. GEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA LATINA/LATINO DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BOOK 1
(1993).
"

See id.

Seeid. atl,7, tbl.l-1.
See RAND California, Population Projections <http://www.ca.rand.org/cgi-bin/
annual.cgi> (visited Apr. 24, 2000) (on file with author).
74 See generally DAVID E. HAYES-BAUTISTA, NO LONGER A MINORITY: LATINOS AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN CALIFORNIA (1992).
'
See GEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 9 tbls.1-3 & fig.1-3. Latinas/os, African Americans,
and Asians together accounted for 32% of the state's population in 1980 (19% Latina/o, 8%
African American, and 5% Asian) and 44% in 1990 (25% Latina/o, 7% African American,
and 9% Asian). See id. at 8 fig.1-2.
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38% of the county's population, and 1980, when they amounted to
over 27%. 76 Indeed, "Los Angeles County alone contains 44% of
California's Latinos.",77 By 2010, Anglo majorities will have disappeared in at least sixteen local jurisdictions, including the highgrowth counties of Fresno, Riverside, and San Bernardino.8
A comparison of the surnames of new home buyers confirms the
shift. Nationally, the top four buyers are named Smith, Johnson,
Brown, and Jones. Garcia shows up at number seven. But in Los
Angeles, the top four buyers are named Garcia, Hernandez,
Martinez, and Gonzalez, all Spanish surnames. The grand "American" name Johnson drops to number seven. 79
Although high birth rates have contributed to Latina/o population growth, the most significant factor continues to be high levels
of immigration from Latin America. From 1951 to 1960, a majority
of immigrants came from Europe. 80 But from 1992 to 1995, 39% of
all immigrants came from Latin America, followed by Asia at
36.2%. Mexico is the leading country of birth for legal immigrants
to California. In fiscal year 1995, the state opened its doors to over
33,000 Mexicans, 20% of all documented immigrants. 8'
Increased immigration, high birth rates, and "white flight" from
urban areas and public schools to suburban areas and private
schools, have resulted in Latina/o domination of California's public schools. In 1997-98, of the state's 5.7 million public school students, 2.3 million (40.5%) were Latina/o compared to 2.2 million
white (38.8%). African Americans
(8.8%) and Asians (8.1%) con2
stituted another million students.

76

'

See id. at 21 tbl.2-5.
JON STILES ET AL., CALIFORNIA LATINO DEMOGRAPHIC DATABOOK 2-4

(California

Policy Seminar publication 1998).
See RAND California, supra note 73.
See id. ("New Home Buyers: Most Common Surnames" table).
See id. at 2 ("Then and Now: Origins of Legal Immigrants" table).
SI
See Julie Hoang, Calfornia Legal Immigrants - Federal Fiscal Year 1995, CAL.
Winter 1997, at 1, 6 (Cal. Dep't of Finance newsletter).
See GEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 8 fig.1-2.
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SELECTED ENROLLMENT IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOL BY ETHNIC GROUP,

1981-82 THROUGH 1997-988'

Year
1981-82
1987-88
1991-92

Hispanic
25.8%
30.1%
35.%

White
56.4%
50.1%
44.5%

Black
9.9%
9.1%
8.6%

Asian
5.5%
7.3%
8.0%

1997-98

40.5%

38.8%

8.8%

8.1%

Similar changes have occurred in the enrollment of limited English proficient ("LEP") students, the vast majority of whom are recent immigrants. From 1982 to 1990, there was an increase of over
430,000 LEP students statewide to 1.4 million - an increase of
226%.8' LEP students accounted for nearly a quarter of all students
enrolled in California public schools. 5 For years, the lion's share
of LEP enrollment has been Spanish-speaking students of Latina/o
origin. In 1993, 47.3% of Latina/o students were LEP; by 1998,
this figure had risen to 49.2%. By contrast, in 1993, 44.1% of Asian
6
students were LEP; by 1998, this figure had dropped to 40.1%.1
As Latina/o numbers in the schools are increasing, they "are
rapidly becoming our largest minority group and have been more
segregated than African Americans for several years." 87 Perhaps the
best example of this segregation is in Los Angeles, where public
school enrollments have long been majority-Latina/o. The Los
Angeles Unified School District was sixty-eight percent Latino in
1996-97."s
Simultaneous with the Latinas/os increase as a percentage of
California public school enrollment, California's spending per pu"

Cal. Dep't of Educ., Enrollment in California Public Schools by Ethnic Group, 1981-

82 through 1997-98, at 1, available in <http.www.cdc.ca.gov/demographics/reports/statewide/ethstud.htm> (visited Apr. 10, 1999) (on file with author). In 1996-1997,
Latinas/os constituted 39.7 % with whites at 39.5% and Asians 11.2 %, of public school
enrollments on California. See GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN

SCHOOLs 7 tbl.3 (1999).
84 See Cal. Dep't of Educ., Number of Limited-English-Proficient (LEP) Students and
Students Redesignated as Fluent-English-Proficient (LEP) in California Public Schools, 1982
Through 1998, at 1, available in <http://www.cdc.ca.gov/demographics/reports/statewide
/redes98/htm> (visited Apr. 10, 1999) (on file with author). Portions of this information
are reproduced graphically below, in Figures 1 and 2.
See id. at I (reporting that in 1998 Hispanic LEP students constituted 24.6% of all
enrollment).
N Id.
87 ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 83, at 2.

See id. at 8 tbl.4.
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pil fell precipitously as a percentage of the national average. The
trends are reflected graphically in Figures 1 and 2.
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Responses to the DemographicChanges:DisadvantagingLatinas/os
and Other Minorities Through Race NeutralProxies

Many legal and political responses, in addition to decreased
funding to the public schools, can be linked to the changing racial
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demographics of the State of California. 9 As the minority population increased as a proportion of the state's population in the postWorld War II period, a variety of laws were passed in response.
Consider the last decade.
Passed in 1994, Proposition 187, which if implemented would
have barred undocumented immigrant children from the public
schools and excluded undocumented immigrants from a variety of
public benefits, would have disparately impacted the community of
persons of Mexican ancestry in California. 9° The initiative galvanized Latina/o voters in the state; they voted overwhelmingly
against a law that Anglo voters decisively supported. 9 Proposition
187 drew the attention of Congress, which in 1996, enacted welfare
"reform" that eliminated eligibility of many legal, as well as undocumented, immigrants from various public benefits. 92 Latina/o
immigrants subsequently flocked to naturalize and become citizens
in order to avoid the potential impacts of the new laws, as well as
other onerous laws punishing noncitizens, and to participate in the
political process to avoid such attacks in the future.
More generally, anti-immigrant sentiment contained a distinctly
anti-Mexican tilt as the century came to a close.94 Drastic immigration reforms in 1996 eliminated judicial review of many immigration decisions of the immigration bureaucracy with devastating

See supratext accompanying notes 69-88.
See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995); Kevin R.Johnson, An Essay
on ImmigrationPolitics, PopularDemocracy, and California'sProposition187: The PoliticalRelevance
and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Immigration
Politics]. A district court enjoined this measure's implementation. See League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). While an appeal was
pending, the parties settled the action. See PatrickJ. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187
Ruling,Ending Court Battles, L.A. TIMEs,july 29, 1999, at Al.
SeeJohnson, ImmigrationPolitics,supra note 90, at 658-59 & n.143.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, §§ 400-51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-77.
" See Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of ImmigrationJurisprudence,67 U.
CIN. L. REv. 185, 197-209 (1998). Not coincidentally, the number of denials of naturalization petitions have risen significantly. See Patrick J. McDonnell, INS Denials of Citizenship
Climb Sharply, L.A.TIMEs,June 14, 1999, at Al (reporting that INS denials rose by 25% during first sixth months of 1998-99 fiscal year, including 1624% increase in Los Angeles INS

office).
" See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic
Mirror"into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1136-40 (1998).
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consequences for minority communities. 95 Deportations of aliens,
especially "criminal aliens," meant the removal of many Mexican
and Central American immigrants. 96 In fiscal year 1998, almost
ninety percent of those removed from the United States were from
Mexico and Central America. 97 At the same historical moment,
hate crimes, police harassment, and violence against Latina/o immigrants and citizens increased. 9
Other laws with similar racial bents often speak in facially neutral
terms. The ever-popular "tough on crime" laws, such as the "three
strikes" law, target minority criminals, as does the claim that certain
politicians are "soft" on crime, as driven home by the famous Willie
Horton advertisements in the 1988 Presidential election.' 9 Welfare
"reform," often directed at women of color, long has been an issue
polarizing minorities and whites, thereby forming a wedge between
racial groups.100
9'
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208,§§ 501-553, 1010 Stat. 3009, 3670-81; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 423, 502, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-77.
For analysis of the criminalization of immigration, see Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant
as Criminal.PunishingDreamers, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1998) and Maria Isabel Media,
The Criminalizationof Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and MarriageFraud,5 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 669 (1997).
See PatrickJ. McDonnell, Deportations IncreaseAlmost 50% in U.S., LA TIMES, Jan. 9,
1999, at Al 7 (reporting on release of latest INS statistical data on removals). Most immigration law scholarship ignores the disparate racial impacts of such strategies. See, e.g., Peter H.
Schuck & John Williams, Removing CriminalAliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 368 (1999). See generally Special Issue, Race and ImmigrationLaw? A
ParadigmShift, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming) (analyzing failure of mainstream immigration law scholarship to consider race).

,See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAzA, THE MAINSTREAMING OF HATE: A REPORT ON
LATINOS AND HARASSMENT, HATE VIOLENCE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ABUSE IN THE '90S

(1999).
9
SeeJODY D. ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997) (analyzing impact of white fears of Black criminality); Paul

Buffer, Racially BasedJury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J.
677 (1995) (advocating jury nullification by African American juries in cases involving African American defendants accused of certain non-violent crimes); AngelaJ. Davis, Prosecution
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (analyzing impact of race on exercise of prosecutorial discretion); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283 (1999) (analyzing significance of racial disparate
impact of crack cocaine laws). For an analysis of crime and the African American community, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997).
"' See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563,
1563 (1996) ("Racial politics has so dominated welfare reform efforts that it is commonplace
to observe that 'welfare' has become a code word for race. When Americans discuss welfare,
many have in mind the mythical Black 'welfare queen' or profligate teenager who becomes
pregnant at taxpayers' expense to fatten her welfare check. Although most welfare recipients are not Black, Black single mothers do rely on a disproportionate share of Aid to Fami-
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Moreover, the political retrenchment with respect to affirmative
action directly challenged the status of racial minorities. Proposition 209, dubbed the "California Civil Rights Initiative," in fact
dismantled affirmative action programs designed to remedy discrimination against the state's minority population"°' and ensure
diversity in employment and education.1 °2 The electorate passed

this law in the face of strong opposition from Latinas/os and African Americans.1°3 Coming on the heels of some high profile judicial decisions rolling back affirmative action, °4 underrepresented
minorities found it difficult to understand Proposition 209 as anything other than an attack directed at them.0 5

lies with Dependent Children.") (footnote omitted); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know
It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 493 (1997) ("The popular perception is that welfare mothers are
black, and while racism has become socially and legally unacceptable, condemning welfare
mothers remains as American as apple pie.") (footnote omitted).
IO'
Previously, the Board of Regents of the University of California had barred consideration of race in admissions decisions. SeeJeffrey B. Wolff, Comment, Affirmative Action in
College and GraduateSchool Admissions - The Effects of Hopwood and the Actions of the U.C. Board
of Regents, 50 SMU L. REV. 627 (1997). In recent years, the state college and university systems in California began charging undocumented persons resident in the state the higher
fees charged to nonresidents, which has had predictably negative impacts on persons of
Mexican ancestry. See Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling out of Schook Undocumented College Residency, Race, andReaction, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1995).
M See Spann, supra note 11, at 293 ("Proposition 209 is ultimately best understood as an
effort to discount the interests of women and racial minorities in order to advance the interests of white males."); see also Deborah Waire Post, The Salience of Race, 15 TOURO L. REV. 351,
373 (1999) ("[T] he anti-affirmative action movement is fueled by the assumption that blacks
are inferior to whites and that they are being given something they do not deserve.").
'" See Elections '96; State Propositions:A Snapshot of Voters, LA TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at A29
(reporting exit poll results showing that 61% of male voters supported Proposition 209
compared to 48% of female voters and that 63% of white voters supported the measure
compared to 26% of Black, 24% of Latina/o, and 39% of Asian American voters).
o
See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all
racial classifications, including those in federal program designed to foster minority businesses, are subject to strict scrutiny); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding
unconstitutional University of Texas law school affirmative action plan), cert. denied sub nom.,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
"® See David Montejano, On the Future of Anglo-Mexican Relations in the United States, in
CHICANO POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 234, 244 (David Monte-

jano ed., 1999) ("[Tlhe English-only movement, the anti-immigration campaign, the anticivil rights sentiment, the reaction to multiculturalism, and so on, all manifest a conservative
'lifeboat' reflex to the changing demographics of the United States, and of the Southwest in
particular."); Guadalupe T. Luna, LatCWrit Theory, "DonPepe" and Sefiora Peralta,19 CHICANOLATINO L. REv. 339, 349-50 (1998) (stating that restrictionist immigration laws, affirmative
action rollbacks, English-only, and welfare "reform" are propagated by political leaders "who
address the public through the use of racial images and stereotypes that are derogatory
towards Mexicans and those of Mexican descent") (footnote omitted).
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D. Summary
In sum, there has been a history of discrimination against Mexican Americans in the California public schools that has evolved
with the times. In the later part of the twentieth century, demographic changes in the racial composition of the state, and its
schools, have provoked legal and political responses negatively impacting Mexican Americans.
III. PROPOSITION

227: DISCRIMINATION BY PROXY

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a court deciding
whether an initiative violates the Equal Protection Clause may consider "the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning
[its] passage and potential impact" and "the milieu in which that
provision would operate. " 106 In the final analysis, it becomes clear
after consideration of these factors that Proposition 227 at its core
"concerns issues of race and racial discrimination.
A.

Languageas an Anglo/LatinaloRacial Wedge Issue

The ability to speak Spanish has long been an issue in California.
For much of the state's history, the public schools adhered to an
English-only policy, with punishment meted out to children who
braved speaking Spanish in the public schools. 07 Sensibilities
changed, however, and some school districts eventually began to
offer bilingual education.'O Nonetheless, "[t] he debate over bilingual education has raged since the 1960s."'09
" Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (invalidating initiative that effectively
offered state approval of private discrimination); see also Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458
U.S. 527, 543 (1982).
107 SeeJULIAN SAMORA & PATRICIA VANDEL SIMON, A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN

PEOPLE 162 (rev. ed. 1993). As Professor Cruz Reynoso has described:
I grew up before we had bilingual education. We were punished for speaking
Spanish in school. It was well intentioned; the teachers wanted us to learn English. Many of us, however, took it as an attack upon our culture, language, upon
everything that we stood for. That educational experience turned negative rather
than positive. Proposition 227... has been viewed by the Latino community as an
abrasive anti-Latino step taken by the electorate.
Cruz Reynoso, The Role of Assets in Assuning Equity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 743, 75455 (1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
"'
Rachel F. Moran, BilingualEducationas Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321, 326 (1987)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Moran, Status Conflict]; see ACU&A, supra note 58, at 293-94
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In Lau v. Nichols," " the Supreme Court held that a school district
violated provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that barred discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The
school district violated this act because it failed to establish a program for non-English speaking students. Critical to our analysis,
the Court treated non-English speaking ability as a substitute for
race, color, or national origin."' Other cases also have treated language as a proxy for race in certain circumstances."2 This reasoning makes perfect sense. Consider the impact that English-only
rules have on Spanish, Chinese, and other non-English speakers. It
is clear at the outset that, under current conditions, such regulations will have racial impacts readily understood by proponents."5
"Given the huge numbers of immigrants who enter this country
from Asian and Latin American countries whose citizens are not
White and who in most cases do not speak English, criticism of the
inability to speak English coincides neatly with race." 4
(focusing on bilingual education debate in 1980s and 1990s). For analysis of the legal history surrounding bilingual education, see Moran, Status Conflict, supra, at 326-41 and Rachel
F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: FederalIntervention in BilingualEducation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
1249 (1988) (analyzing federal intervention in bilingual education as a fight for control with
states for ability to establish educational policy).
.. 414 U.S. 563 (1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 63-68 (discussing Lau in
context of history of bilingual education litigation).
- See Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-ConflatingLatinas/os'Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 69, 147-48 (1998); see also Note, "Official English": Federal

Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1345, 1357-59
(1987) (contending that "a strong case can be made for the proposition that the designs of
English-only advocates satisfy the intent requirement" for proving Equal Protection violation).
"2 See, e.g.,
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 524-28 (1926) (holding that law
prohibiting Chinese merchants from keeping books in Chinese violated their Equal Protection rights); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that Alabama policy
of offering driver's license examinations only in English discriminates against non-English
speakers and national origin minorities); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that investigation of those who requested bilingual ballots, which were
printed only in Spanish and Chinese, discriminated on basis of national origin), vacated as
moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987); see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298-99 (9th Cir.
1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasizing that language regulation can mask impermissible race discrimination); Gutierrez v. Municipal
Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1038-40 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
1
Indeed, evidence suggests that racism is at the core of certain English only organizations. One well-known group, for example, was publicly embarrassed when a racist, antiLatina/o document came to light that forced a prominent Latina leader to resign. See
CHAVEz, supra note 12, at 91-92 (describing incident).
.' Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and CulturalPluralism:Addressing the
Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven MultiracialSociety, 81 CAL. L. REV.
863, 874 (1993); see e. christi cunningham, The "Racing"Cause of Action and the Identity Formerly
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The sociological concept of status conflict also helps explain the
intensity of the racial divisiveness generated by laws regulating language usage."' Anglos and Latinas/os see language as a fight for
status in U.S. society. Courts" 6 and commentators" 7 have analyzed
extensively the Latina/o fight against English only laws and regulations."" Some vocal critics claim that the alleged demise of the
English language in the United States has "splintered" U.S. society.119 "Unfortunately, the English-only movement... hosts an undeniable component of nativism .and anti-Latino feeling." 20 Not
coincidentally, English-only initiatives have tended to be in states
with significant
Latina/o, Asian, Native American, or foreign born
2
populations. '
With race at the core, the modem English-only and bilingual
education controversies are closely related. Latinas/os resist the
Known as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 707, 709-10 (1999) (discussing
connection between culture and race).
. See Moran, Status Conflict, supra note 109, at 341-45.
"' See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1228 (1994) (holding that employer's English only rule did not violate Title VII); Gutierrez,
838 F.2d at 1031 (enjoining enforcement of English-only rule); Long v. Baeza, 894 F. Supp.
933 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding that similar policy did not violate Title VII); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding employers English-only rule); EEOC v. SynchroStart Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that EEOC had stated valid
claim based on employer's English-only rule).
.. See, e.g., BILL PIATt, ONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1990); Mark L. Adams, Fearof Foreigners:Nativism and Workplace LanguageRestrictions,
74 OR. L. REv. 849 (1995); Stephen W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv.
145 (1997); Antonio J. Califa, DeclaringEnglish the Official Language:PrejudiceSpoken Here, 24
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293 (1989); Cameron, supra note 7; Drucilla Cornell & William W.
Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 585 (1999); see also Lazos, JudicialReview, supra note
10, at 399, 433-47, 551-52 (listing English-only and bilingual education initiatives passed by
states in recent years).
"' See Michael W. Valente, Comment, One Nation Divisible by Language: An Analysis of
Official English Laws in the Wake ofYniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 205, 209-10 (1997) (compiling various English only laws proposed in Congress
and those enacted by states). Discrimination on the basis of accent is a related concern. See
MariJ. Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and ajurisprudencefortheLast
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1325 (1991); see also Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1989) (addressing Title VII claim alleging accent discrimination); Carino v. University of Oklahoma, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) ("A foreign accent that does not
interfere with a Title VII claimant's ability to perform duties of the position he has been
denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment decisions."); Forsythe v.
Board of Education, 956 F. Supp. 927 (D. Kan. 1997) (quoting Carino).
...
See, e.g., ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER,JR., THE DISUNITING OFAMERICA (1992).
Lazos,JudicialReview, supra note 10, at 442.
"
See id. at 435-40.
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language onslaught as an attack on their identity. "[L]anguage
minorities understand English-only initiatives as targeted at them
.... Spanish ... is related [to] affective attitudes of self-identity

and self-worth. Thus, language symbolizes deeply held feelings
about identity and is deeply
embedded in how individuals place
22
themselves within society."

The intensity of the language debate at times is difficult to comprehend unless one views the laws as symbolic attacks under color
of law against minority groups. 23 For example, California voters in
1986 passed an advisory initiative that had no legal impact but
to
1 24
declare English the official language of the state of California.
[O]pponents contended the measure conveyed a symbolic message that culturally and linguistically different groups were unwanted. They alleged that the campaign was a thinly veiled form
of racism and derived from anti-immigrant sentiment.
[S]upporters argued that it was a common sense
way. to125ensure
•
.
that California's population remained politically cohesive.
Importantly, symbolic action of this nature can have concrete
long-term impacts. In 1990, Professor Julian Eule observed that
recent efforts in Arizona, California, and Colorado declaring English the official language were largely "symbolic and offer little opId. at 445. As Professor Rachel Moran has observed:
Participants in the debate over bilingual education have often responded in
deeply emotional ways that seem to transcend immediate concerns with the allocation of scarce resources. Some have openly acknowledged that more than
pedagogy is at stake becausegovernment support of bilingual education signals acceptance
of and respect for the Hispaniccommunity.
Moran, Status Conflict, supra note 109, at 341 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
US
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of
Membership Self-FulfillingProphecies , 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 14 (1998) (stating that, in light of
strong empirical evidence that immigrants learn English, initiatives like Proposition 227
.seem aimed less at pursuing the intended goal (teaching English) than at tightening the
circle of membership"); Terry, supra note 1 ("Proposition 227 is about much more than
what is printed in the initiative. It is about race, class, culture, shifting demographics, politics, fear and sometimes even education.").
"' See CAL CONST. art. III, § 6; see also Moran, Status Conflict, supra note 109, at 332 n.63
(reporting survey results reflecting racially-polarized vote).
" Moran, Status Conflict, supranote 109, at 332 (footnote omitted). One complicating
factor was that the measure was supported by a Japanese American, U.S. Senator S.I.
Hayakawa. See id. at 331-32. Oddly enough, Hayakawa wrote that, although he supported the
proposition, he was "a finn believer in effective bilingual education." See S.I.
Hayakawa, A
Common Language, So All Can Pursue Common Goals, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1986, at B5.
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portunity for courts to remedy the gratuitous insult" to non-English
speakers. 126 However, he predicted that such measures would be
"invoked in efforts to terminate states' bilingual programs" and
that "[a]ttempts to demonstrate that the initiatives are motivated
by racial animus [as required by the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence] will encounter.., proof difficulties...., 2 7
Unfortunately, this is precisely what has happened. State English-only laws were followed by English-only regulations in the
workplace and, ultimately, attacks such as Proposition 227, on bilingual education. 28 And, as we shall see, it proved difficult to establish that states enacted such laws with a discriminatory intent.
B.

The Case of Proposition227

Following closely upon "the gratuitous insult" to Latinas/os
transmitted by voter approval of English-only measures in Arizona,
California, and Colorado, proponents unveiled Proposition 227 in
July 1997 and it came before the California voters in June 1998.
Although not identifying Latinas/os by name, the measure's text
and context leave little doubt that a motivating factor behind its
passage was to attack educational opportunities for Spanishspeaking Latinas/os, especially Mexican immigrants29
1.

The Language of the Initiative

The people targeted by Proposition 227 are identified in the official title of the measure. This title, English Language Education
for Immigrant Children, 30 was shortened by advocates during the
campaign to English for the Children. 3' In the "Findings and Declarations," Proposition 227 refers four times to immigrants or immigrant children. Mention is made of "[ilmmigrant parents," who
"are eager to have their children acquire a good knowledge of Eng-

' Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview ofDirect Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1567 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
"

Id.

See infra text accompanying notes 129-217.
See infra text accompanying notes 130-217.
"
See Cal. Prop. 227, § 1, codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE ch. 3 (West Supp. 1999).
"'
"English for the Children" was also the name of the principal group advocating
passage of Proposition 227. Its chairman was Ron Unz, who drafted the initiative. See, e.g.,
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 34 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 227).
"'
"
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lish";132 the state's public school system, which has done "a poorjob
of educating immigrant children";13

3

the "wast[e of] financial re-

sources on costly experimental language programs whose failure
*

. is demonstrated by the current high drop-out rates and low

.

English literacy levels of many immigrant children";3 4 and the resiliency of "[y]oung immigrant children," who "can easily acquire full
fluency in a new language,
such as English, if they are heavily ex1 35
posed to that language."

6
In a state where Latinas/os dominate the ranks of immigrants,1
public school children, and non-English speakers, references to
immigrants necessarily refer primarily to Latinas/os. From 1992 to
1995, the largest group of legal immigrants to California - almost
forty percent - came from Latin America, 3 1 with more hailing
from Mexico than any other country. 38 In 1998, Latinas/os constituted over forty percent of California public school children enrolled in kindergarten through twelfth grade.'3 9 According to the
1990 census, among the state's school age children who lived in
households where nobody over age fourteen spoke only English or
spoke English well, over seventy percent lived in Spanish-speaking
homes.' 4° In the California schools, students not fluent in English
are classified as "limited English proficient" or "LEP."14 In 1996,

Cal. Prop. 227, § 300(b), codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE ch. 3 (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
... Id. § 300(d) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
"s
"'

Id. § 300(e) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.

immigrants.

This does not include undocumented
In October 1996, the estimated undocumented population in California was

about two million with immigrants from Mexico constituting roughly 54% of the total undocumented population. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 200 tbl.N (1999) [hereinafter INS STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK].
... See Hoang, supra note 81, at 1, 6 (reporting that, in 1995, 20% of all legal immigrants

intending to settle in California were born in Mexico).
'9
See California Basic Educational Data System, Public School Summary Statistics, 199899, at 3, available online at <http://www.cdc.ca.gov/demographics/reports/statewide/
sums98.htm> (visited Aug. 3, 1999) (K-12 enrollment, by ethnic group).
" See GEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 34 tbls.3-5. Almost one-fourth lived in Asian-

language-speaking homes and five percent in other-language-speaking homes. See id.
141

See, e.g., Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also supra

text accompanying notes 84-86 (discussing increased numbers of Latina/o limited English
proficient students in California schools).
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42
over 1.3 million LEP students attended the state's 43public schools,
with more than a million being Spanish-speakers.
In addition to the disparate impact on Latinas/os, the initiative
places special burdens on them. First, Proposition 227 proclaims
as public policy what every Latina/o immigrant in this country already knows: that English "is the national public language of the
United States of America and the State of California.. . and is also
the leading world language for science, technology, and international business, thereby being the language of economic opportu-

nity.' 44 This statement is curious in light of the fact that Latina/o
strive to - and in fact do - acquire Engimmigrants and citizens
4
lish language skills. 1

Second, the heart of the measure, section 305, eliminates the
right of Latina/o parents to choose how their children will acquire
English language skills and imposes a one-size-fits-all approach:
[A]ll children in California public schools shall be taught English
by being taught in English ....

[T]his shall require that all chil-

dren be placed in English language classrooms. Children who
are English learners shall be educated through sheltered English
immersion during a temporary transition period not normally intended to exceed one year.146
This flies in the face of this nation's firm tradition of protecting
fundamental family decisions, such as the type of education the
children should receive, from governmental interference. 47 Section 305 denies Latina/o parents the choice of having their children taught English through gradual exposure rather than
through mandatory immersion. It also dismisses the views of bilingual education experts, many of whom believe that non-English-

"2 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 51 n.86 (relying on Exhibit B to Declaration of Christopher Ho),
Valeria G. v. Wilson, Case No. C 98-2252 CAL (N.D. Cal. 1998).
,'

See id.

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1999).
See Aleinikoff& Rumbaut, supra note 123, at 11-14 (reviewing empirical data).
j6
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1999).
"
See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state law requiring all children to attend public school).
"'
145
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speaking children generally need years of study in a second language to become proficient enough to succeed in it academically. "8
Finally, section 310, which permits parents to petition for bilingual instruction, requires that the child's parent or guardian provide "written informed consent."'14 Such consent, however, cannot
be obtained in the time-tested manner, that is, by having the parent sign a consent form. Section 310 instead requires that a "parent or legal guardian personally visit the school to apply for the
waiver."' Imagine the reaction of Anglo parents if a provision of
the California Education Code effectively required them, but not
African American, Asian, or Latina/o parents, to personally visit a
school before their children could opt out of mandatory education
programs.
2.

Ballot Arguments

Like the language of the initiative, the Proposition 227 campaign
often spoke softly and subtly about race. Most campaign materials
did not squarely mention race. Opponents feared raising the claim
of racial discrimination because of a possible backlash.' 5' The ballot arguments in the voters pamphlet, however, make clear that the
initiative singles out Latinas/os. Despite paying homage to "the
best of intentions" with which the architects of bilingual programs
began their efforts,'5 2 the proponents sharply criticize those programs and explicitly refer to persons of Latina/o (and no other)
descent.
First, the Proposition 227 advocates proclaimed that "If]or most
of California's non-English speaking students, bilingual education
actually means monolingual, SPANISH-ONLY education for the
first 4 to 7 years of school."'1

No mention is made of the type of

education afforded any other group of students, whether African
American, Asian, or white. Second, the argument identifies "La.. See, e.g., Betsy Streisand, IsIt Hastala Vistafor BilingualEd?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 24, 1997, at 36, 38 (quoting University of California, Davis Professor Patricia Gindara,
who has conducted extensive research on subject).
'4' CAL. EDUC. CODE § 310 (West Supp. 1999).
Id. (emphasis added). For discussion of various issues that have arisen concerning
I
waivers, see Thomas F. Felton, Comment, Sink or Swim? The State of Bilingual Education in the
Wake of California'sProposition 227, 48 CATH. U.L. REv. 843, 871-73 (1999) and supra note 3,
citing cases involving Proposition 227, including one that involved parental waivers.
ltd
See Gregory Rodriguez, English Lesson in California,NATION, Apr. 20, 1998, at 15.
"2
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 34 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 227).
53 Id..
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tino immigrant children" as "the principal victims of bilingual education," because they have the highest dropout rates and lowest test
scores of any group.154
Third, the proponents of the measure state that "[m]ost Latino
parents [support the initiative], according to public polls. They
know that Spanish-only bilingual education is preventing their children from learning English by segregating them into an educational dead-end." 5 5 If Proposition 227 were truly race neutral, it
would be unnecessary to invoke the alleged political opinions of
Latina/o parents. 56 Similarly, the rebuttal to the argument against
Proposition 227 criticized the measure's opponents as the leaders
of organizations whose members "receive HUNDREDS OF
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS annually5 from
our failed system of
7
education."
bilingual
SPANISH-ONLY
3.

Statements by Advocates

At first glance, the overt anti-Latina/o sentiments that surfaced
during the racially-charged campaigns for Propositions 18758 and
209151 seemed to be missing from the Proposition 227 campaign.
California Governor Pete Wilson campaigned vigorously for passage of these racially-divisive immigration and affirmative action
initiatives and gained the reputation as "the greatest bogeyman for
Latinos." 60 Quirky Silicon Valley millionaire Ron Unz, who wrote,
financed, and directed the campaign for Proposition 227, and had
once challenged Pete Wilson for the Republican gubernatorial
/d.
I54
/d.
I5

As it turned out, the polling was inaccurate; Latinas/os voted against the initiative by
a margin of nearly two to one. See infra text accompanying notes 199-217.
W5 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 35 (Rebuttal to Argument
Against Proposition
227). Along similar lines, Proposition 227 proponents argued that California lacked the
financial resources to effectively implement bilingual education, which long had been criticized from many fronts. SeeAmy S. Zabetakis, Note, Proposition227: Deathfor BilingualEducation, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 105, 120-22 (1998); see also supra text accompanying notes 41-62
(analyzing inequality in California public schools caused by school finance system).
M SeeJohnson, Immigration Politics, supra note 90, at 654-58 (documenting disturbing
anti-Latina/o statements made by drafters Ron Prince and Barbara Coe and by elected
public officials).
" See Benjamin A. Doherty, Comment, Creative Advocacy in Defense of Affirmative Action: A
ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis of Proposition 209, 1999 WIs. L. REv. 91, 103-07 (describing
racial messages in Proposition 209 campaign, including David Duke's racist appeals in support of the initiative).
" John Marelius, Wilson Bristles at Claims He's Playing RacialPolitics, Copley News Serv.,
May 20, 1998, at 1 (quoting Professor Fernando Guerra).
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nomination, took a different tack. Having opposed Proposition
187, 1 Unz distanced himself from Wilson and other kindred spirits.

16

From the outset, the sponsors of Proposition 227 denied any racial animus. Unz claimed to support Latina/o parents who kept
their children out of bilingual classes and insisted that they learn
English. 162 To unveil Proposition 227, he went to Jean Parker Elementary School in San Francisco, 16 where nearly a quarter-century
earlier the family of Kinney Lau, an immigrant Chinese student,
had successfully sued the city's school district to secure Lau's right
to receive a bilingual public education.64 In media appearances,
Unz asserted that Proposition 227 was neither anti-immigrant nor
anti-Latina/o 165 and proclaimed that any victory would be morally
hollow without Latina/o support. 66 All of which prompted some
Latinas/os, such as California Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa, to regard Unz167as "a decent guy, although we have different
views of the world."

Three of the four principal spokespersons who joined Unz in
sponsoring Proposition 227 were Latinas/os.' Nevertheless, many
'
See id.; see also Lou Cannon, Bilingual Education Under Attack, WASH. POST, July 21,
1997, at A15 (quoting Unz as calling Governor Wilson's campaign for Proposition 187 "despicable" and as saying no one associated with that campaign, or others with "anti-immigrant
views," would be permitted to join Proposition 227 campaign).
162 See Zabetakis, supra note 157,
at 111.
SeeNanette Asimov, BilingualEducation Gets Foe, S.F. CHRON.,July 18, 1997, at A17.
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 63-68,
110-14 (discussing Lau v. Nichols).
" See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 8, 1998) (transcript no.
98010806-210) (quoting Unz: "This is in no way an anti-Latino initiative or an antiimmigrant initiative or anything other than something that will benefit, most of all, California's immigrant and Latino population."); Cannon, supra note 161 (quoting Unz: "It would
be a disaster if this initiative was perceived as anti-immigrant because it is not.").
" See Rodriguez, English Lesson in California, supra note 151, at 15 (quoting Unz to this
effect).
167 Gregory Rodriguez, Speaking in Tongues: Divining Why CaliforniaLatinos
Voted as They
Did on Proposition 227, NEW DEMOCRAT, July-Aug. 1998, at 18 (quoting Villaraigosa). Villaraigosa later touched off a firestorm of controversy among Latinas/os when he appointed Unz
to a high-profile California panel on government finance. See Mark Gladstone, Speaker Urged
to Rescind Unz Appointment, LA TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at A3.
lm They were: Gloria Matta Tuchman, a Mexican American school teacher, see Nick
Anderson, Latina Teacher Pushes FightAgainst BilingualEducation, LA TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at
B2 (hereinafter Anderson, Latina Teacher Pushes] (describing Matta Tuchman), Jaime Escalante, an East Los Angeles high school teacher who served as honorary campaign chairman,
see Phil Garcia, Noted TeacherBacks Initiative,L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1997, at N1O (describing Escalante), made famous by the movie STAND AND DELIVER (Warner Bros. 1987) starring
Edward James Olmos as Escalante, and Fernando Vega, a Democratic Party activist and
former school board member who became honorary chairman of the Northern California
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statements made by supporters demonstrated an intent to single
out Spanish-speaking Latinas/os in a way that would not be tolerated if aimed at Anglos. Unz, for example, unfavorably compared
today's Latina/o immigrants to the European immigrants of the
1920s and 1930s.'6 9 He acknowledged that the only group of children given large quantities of "so-called bilingual instruction are
Latino-Spanish speaking children" 70 and emphasized that Proposition
227 was "something that will benefit, most of all, California'simmigrant and Latino population."71

Responding to the argument that

bilingual education helps immigrant pupils learn better by teaching them respect for their culture, he sharply responded that "[i] t
isn't the duty of172
the public schools to help children maintain their
'
native culture.'

Emphasizing that she was a Latina supporter of Proposition 227,
cosponsor Gloria Matta Tuchman played a similar role for Unz that
Ward Connerly, an African American, did for Governor Wilson in
the Proposition 209 campaign. 173 She exuded the tough-love assimilationism of her father, who taught her that, "Anglos did us a
favor by making us learn English. That's why we are so successcampaign, see BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 34. The fact that certain supporters were
Latina/o does not undermine the discriminatory intent analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 173-80. Minorities, as African American businessman Ward Connerly demonstrated in being the anti-affirmative action point person in California, frequently are placed
in high-profile roles in defending discriminatory measures. See infra note 180 (referring to
"racial mascot" phenomenon).
-6 See Mark S. Barabak, GOP Bid to Mend Rift with Latinos Still Strained, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
31, 1997, at B8 (quoting campaign letter sent by Unz for Proposition 227 - "[P]oor European immigrants [earlier this century] came here to WORK and become successful ... not
sit back and be a burden on those who were already here!" - and mentioning only one
group, Latinas/os, and one non-English language, Spanish, as problematic).
0 CNN Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast, May 29, 1998) (transcript no.
98052900V14) (remarks of Ron Unz) (emphasis added).
"7 Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 8, 1998) (transcript no.
98010806-210) (emphasis added). The fact that Unz and some supporters may have wanted
to benefit Latinas/os should not make a legal difference so long as it is clear that language
was used as a proxy for race. See infra text accompanying notes 250-64. Under current Supreme Court precedent, all racial classifications, even if arguably benign, receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Such intentions,
however, may be relevant to the discriminatory intent analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 225-42.
" Asimov, supra note 163 (quoting Unz). Furthermore, Unz told one journalist that
bilingual education "is a bizarre government program," see Cannon, supra note 161, at A15,
and another that even the respectable academic research supporting it was "garbage," see
Nick Anderson, Debate Loud as Vote Nears on BilingualBan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at Al
[hereinafter Anderson, Debate Loud].
"
See Nick Anderson, Latina Teacher Pushes FightAgainst BilingualEducation, LA TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1997 at B2 [hereinafter Anderson, Latina TeacherPushes Fight].
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Although few would question the importance to immigrants

of learning English, 7 5 coerced assimilation, which too often calls
upon immigrants to renounce their176native language and other ties
to their heritage, is another matter.

Ron Unz's comments demonstrate the pro-Proposition 227 campaign's efforts to attack Latinas/os by using Latina/o figureheads:
"Gloria [Matta Tuchman] is the best possible spokesperson for
something like this," Unz said. "Her ethnicity, her gender.., all
those things play an important role."

77

"Unz called [Jaime] Esca-

lante's support a 'tremendous boost' to his campaign.... Having
the most prominent Latino educator serving as honorary chairman
really just allows more of these Latino public figures to voice their
true feelings on the issue,' Unz said.'

7

8

"Unz says he hopes Esca-

lante's support of the campaign will help shake loose support...
from California's GOP leaders. . ..

""9 Consequently, Latina/o

80
supporters were used to serve anti-Latina/o ends.
In the end, it is difficult to state how many Proposition 227 supporters were influenced by race. The web page of One Nation/One California, which helped place Proposition 227 on the
ballot, candidly admits that anti-Latina/o sentiment added to support for the measure:

There is a strong public perception that many opponents of "bilingual education" are using the issue as a cover for anti-Latino
and anti-immigrant views. Unfortunately, this is often true. [Pirivate

English-Only Candidate,City News Serv., Feb. 12, 1998, at 1 (quoting Tuchman).
See supra text accompany note 145 (discussing English language acquisition by Latinas/os).
176 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, "MeltingPot" or "Ringof Fire"? Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997) (analyzing history of assimilation of
Mexican Americans into U.S. society).
"
Nick Anderson, Latina TeacherPushes Fight,supra note 173 (quoting Unz).
"
Phil Garcia, Noted Teacher Backs Initiative, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1997, at N1O
(quoting Unz).
" Gayle M.B. Hansen, When Bilingualism Is a Dirty Word, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec. 22
1997, at 18.
' Minorities frequently find themselves employed as visible supporters for political
ends considered by many to be antiminority. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow
of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 121
(1998) (referring to "increasing use of people of color as spokespersons or 'racial mascots'
for racially regressive policies").
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polling indicates that anger at "bilingual education" is a leading
8
1
cause of anti-immigrant sentiment among California Anglos.'
Similarly, Ron Unz "admit[ted] that some of the initiative's supporters are no doubt anti-immigrant."'8 2
Significant contributors to the pro-Proposition 227 campaign
also had racial aims. For example, One Nation/One California,
which gave over one million dollars to the campaign, 8 3 expressed
concern with "ethnic nationalism."' 84 The California English Campaign, which contributed almost twenty thousand dollars to the
supporters of Proposition 227,185 expressed deep concerns with the
emerging racial mix:
We are all American, but in recent years, our country has been
losing its sense of cohesiveness, of unity and of an American
identity. Among the reasons for these losses are a lack of an
official language (which in our country must be English),
bilingual education (meaning teaching immigrant children in
native languages), foreign language ballots, drivers license tests
(in scores of languages),
rising ethnic
nationalism,
multilingualism, multiculturalism.Iss
Race was near the surface of the campaign. Linda Chavez, the
conservative Reagan Administration official turned syndicated columnist, attacked A. Jerrold Perenchio, the non-Latino television
executive of Univision Communications, a Spanish language media
outlet, who contributed $1.5 million to defeat Proposition 227.87 A
school activist supporting the initiative accused Oakland school
"' The 1998 California "English of the Children" Initiative, <http://www.onenation.og
/facts.html> (visited April 6, 1999) (emphasis added).
'
" Terry, supra note 1. Long after the election, Unz wrote an article analyzing the racially-charged campaigns over Propositions 187, 209, and 227 and attributed the divisiveness
in part to demographic changes brought by immigration. "Terrified of social decay and
violence, and trapped by collapsed property values, many whites felt they could neither run
nor hide. Under these circumstances, attention inevitably began to focus on the tidal force
of foreign immigration." Ron Unz, California and the End of White America, COMMENTARY,
Nov. 1999, at 17.
'm See Laura M. Padilla, Internalized Oppression, Latinos and Law, at 44 (Unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
See One Nation/One California, <http://www. Onenation.org/aboutionoc.html>.
"
See Padilla, supra note 183, at 45.
' National English Campaign and California English Campaign <http://www. peoplesadvocate.org/ord/bmprimary98/prop227.html> (on file with author).
Liida Chavez, Keeping Bilingual-EducationProgramsIntact Makes for Lucrative Business,
CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1998, Commentary, at 21, at A4.
117
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officials of forcing bilingual education on English-speaking African
American students.'..
To some extent, the harshest anti-Latina/o sentiments were expressed by Proposition 227's advocates after the election. 89 The
head of the restrictionist Federation for American Immigration
Reform, responded to a pro-immigration speech by President Clinton a few days after the measure passed, by stating that "[r]ather
than revitalize the cities, immigrants have driven Americans out of
the cities. Native-born Americans are fleeing cities like Los Angeles
because of the impact of excessively high levels of immigration."190
The president of the restrictionist Voice of Citizens Together, who
had campaigned for Proposition 187, in effect predicted a race war
and suggested that California's demographic changes themselves
were the problem: "[Proposition 227] passed overwhelmingly except for the Mexican and the black vote."' 1'
4. The Latina/o Reaction
Even if what the advocates of Proposition 227 said could be considered race neutral, what many Latinas/os actually heard was yet
another direct attack on them. The initiative inevitably attracted
support from Californians uncomfortable with the growing
Latina/o population and lost support among Latinas/os who saw
the measure as an extension of Propositions 187 and 209.92
Among bilingual education teachers who worked directly with immigrant Latina/o children, feelings about Proposition 227 hit especially close to home. One first grade teacher said "It's a painful
subject. I can't even begin to explain to somebody the pain and
fright that children 93
are going to feel if they are thrown into an allEnglish classroom."

Recalling the nasty Propositions 187 and 209 campaigns, one
prominent attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund called Proposition 227 "the third in a chain of

See Hansen, supranote 179.
See infra text accompanying notes 190-91, 199-217.
Doyle McManus, Clinton Hails Benefits of Legal Migration to America, L.A. TIMES, June
14, 1998, atAl (quoting Dan Stein).
M Ralph Z. Hallow, California Steeped in Identity Politics,WAsH. TIMEs, June 15, 1998, at
Al (quoting Glenn Spencer).
SeeCannon, supra note 161.
Anderson, Debate Loud, supra note 172 (quoting Eliana Escobar).
'

"s
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anti-immigrant, anti-Latino proposals." 9 4 The vice president for

the National Council of La Raza wondered: "Hasn't the state had
enough? Do we need another racially charged, sharp-edged debate about a hot-button, political wedge issue?" 9 5 California Congressman Xavier Becerra characterized Proposition 227 as "immigrant-bashing."" Speaker of the California Assembly Antonio Villaraigosa called the measure "divisive and polarizing." 97 State Democratic Party Chair Art
Torres called it "another attack" on the
9
Latina/o community.

5.

8

The Results

At the June 1998 election, Anglos heavily supported Proposition
227 while Latinas/os strongly opposed it. Specifically, although
the measure passed by a 61-39% margin, '9 Latinas/os, according to
exit polls, opposed the measure by a 63-37%,200 which was contrary
to what the pre-election polls had predicted.2 0 ' The election results

are generally consistent with survey results showing that over 80%
of Latinas/os supported bilingual education. °2

'" Streisand, supra note 148 (quoting Joseph Jaramillo); see also Anderson, Latina
Teacher Pushes Fight,supra note 173 (quoting MALDEF attorney Theresa Fe Bustillos to same
effect).
Anderson, Debate Loud, supranote 172 (quoting Charles Kamasaki).
Ron Unz, Swimming Instructor,ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 32 (quoting Becerra).
197 Marelius, supra note 160 (quoting Villaraigosa).
"
Unz, supranote 196 (quoting Torres).
', See supranote 3 (citing authority). The official vote was 3.6 million (60.88%) for and
slightly less than 2.3 million (39.12%) against. See BILLJONES, [CAL.] SECRETARY OF STATE,
STATEMENT OFVOTE: PRIMARY ELECTIONJUNE 2, 1998, at 86 (1998).
"'
SeeLos Angeles Times Exit Poll, California Primary Election,June 2, 1998, at 1 (showing that whites supported the measure by 67-33% and Asian Americans supported it by 5743% while Latinas/os opposed it by 63-37% and African Americans by 52-48%); see also
Rodriguez, supranote 167 (analyzing why Latinas/os voted against Proposition 227). Interestingly, 6% of the supporters recognized that Proposition 227 "discriminates against nonEnglish speaking students" compared to 32% of the opponents. See Los Angeles Times Exit
Poll, supra, at 3.
Wo See Ramon G. McLeod & Mara Alicia Gaura, Proposition227 Got Few Latino Votes: Early
Polls Had Claimed More Minority Support, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 1998, at A19. According to
polling data, Latina/o support for Proposition 227 eroded as election day neared. See FIELD
POLL, VOTERS MOVING TO THE No SIDE ON PROPS. 226 (UNION DUES) AND 223 (SCHOOL
SPENDING LIMITS) 4 (May 29, 1998).
' See Gerald P. L6pez, Learning About Latinos, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 363, 391
(1998) (summarizing survey data to this effect); see also PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS:
THE AMBIVALENT MINORITY 283-91 (1993) (summarizing survey data indicating general
support of Mexican Americans for bilingual education).
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In light of what we have detailed above about the anti-Latina/o
animus behind Proposition 227,203 the wide split between Anglo
and Latina/o voters should surprise no one. What is surprising is
that so many never saw the Latina/o rejection coming. Before the
election, nearly every poll reportedly showed strong support for
Proposition 227 among Latina/o voters. 20 4 In November 1997, before the initiative had qualified for the ballot, a Los Angeles Times
poll claimed that 84% of Latinas/os, as contrasted with 80% of
whites, supported it. 2 5 Latina/o opposition, claimed U.S. News &
World Report, was confined largely to "bilingual-education teachers
and Hispanic activists." 20 6 In March 1998, the Field Poll reported
that 61% of Latinas/os and 70% of the general population supported Proposition 227.07 In April 1998, The Economist reported
that various polls showed that 55% to 65% of Latinas/os and 63%
of all voters still favored the initiative.2°" Frequent repetition by
noted political commentators gave credence to the polls. 2

4

In-

deed, the proponents of Proposition 227 in the voter ballot pamphlet distributed to voters stated unequivocally that "[m]ost Latino
parents" favored the initiative.2 10 Ron Unz went so far as to say that
the initiative's broad support might unify Californians with "a vote
which cuts across party lines, which
crosses ideological lines and
21
which crosses lines of ethnicity."

1

It was only Latina/o media outlets that accurately documented
the coming tide of resentment among Latina/o voters toward
Proposition 227. In early 1998, La Opinion, Southern California's
leading Spanish newspaper, and a Spanish television station com-

"
"

See supra text accompanying notes 129-98.
See McLeod & Guara, supranote 201.
See, e.g., Streisand, supra note 148 (reporting results of L.A. Times poll).
Id.

See Deroy Murdock, Bye Bye Bilingualism, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, at Al 7.
:' See Unz, supra note 196 (reporting results of unidentified polls of Latinas/os and L.A.
Times poll for all voters).
'"
See, e.g., Gregory Rodriguez, The BilingualismDebate Remakes California Politics, WASHI.
POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at C2 ("Surprisingly to some, early surveys by the Los Angeles Times and
the Field Poll showed that Latino registered voters supported the initiative by a wide margin.") Rodriguez also reported that "early polls" showed registered Latina/o voters supporting Prop. 227 "by as big a margin as 66 percent to 30 percent." See id.
20
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supranote 2, at 334 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 227).
21 Nick Anderson & Peter M. Warren, English-Immersion Initiative Makes Ballot,
L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at BI (quoting Unz).
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missioned a poll showing that
43% of Latinas/os favored Proposi2 12
tion 227 but 49% opposed it.

Despite Latina/o voter rejection of Proposition 227, after the
election the media continued to report that Latinas/os supported
the measure. For at least two days after the vote, the Associated
Press, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, and
DallasMorning News, all erroneously reported that Latinas/os voted
in favor of the measure by wide margins. 213 These errors before
and after the vote demonstrate that Proposition 227 was conceived,
debated, and enacted in an atmosphere of obsession with Latinas/os and their views about the measure.
As the campaign and racially-polarized results demonstrate,
Proposition 227 exacerbated already existing racial tensions. 24 A
horrible attack on a white principal of a predominantly Latina/o
school in the Los Angeles area made this point clear. 5 Latina/o
students at a number of high schools walked out of class.216 Within
weeks of Proposition 227's passage, a group of men attacked,
kicked, and assaulted two Latinos at a convenience store in Lancaster, California,
while yelling "What are you wetbacks doing in
,2 1 7
here?

C.

The DiscriminatoryIntent Necessaryfor an Equal Protection
Violation?

In Valeria G. v. Wilson,1 8 the district court rejected all challenges
to Proposition 227. The court specifically held against the plaintiffs on an Equal Protection claim based on the argument that the
initiative created a political barrier that disadvantaged racial minorities.1 9 In so doing, the court emphasized that, even if the
2
See, e.g., Leonel Sanchez, Latino Views Differ Sharply on Question of BilingualEducation,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 15, 1998, at BI (reporting poll results).
...See Charlie Ericksen, Media Misleading About Hispanic Vote on Prop. 227, HOUSTON
CHRON.,June 11, 1998, at A33.
'
See Louis Sahagun, Diversity Challenges Schools to Preserve Racial Harmony, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1999, at A] (reporting on racial tensions at Los Angeles public schools).
.. See Andrew Blankstein & Michael Luo, Principa4 65, Badly Beaten in Alleged Hate Crime,
LA TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at B1.
6 SeeJennifer Hamm, Oxnard Students Leave Class for 2nd Day in 227 Protest, LA TIMES
(Ventura County ed.),June 9, 1998, at Bi.
"' NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAzA, supra note 98, at 5. Analysis of this incident is complicated by that fact that the attackers were Asian American. See id.
...12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
See id. at 1023-24. The court of appeals rejected a similar challenge to Proposition
209. See supranote 11 (discussing nature of unsuccessful challenge).
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measure had a disproportionate impact on a minority group, the
plaintiffs failed to establish the necessary discriminatory intent for
an Equal Protection challenge. 2 0

According to the court, the

plaintiffs did not attempt to satisfy this "burden [but claimed] that
22
they [were] not arguing a 'conventional' equal protection claim."
An amicus curiae brief submitted in Valeria G. contended that
Proposition 227 violated international law, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,2
thereby "impl [ying] that Proposition 227 was motivated by racial or
national origin discrimination." 223

Finding that the issue was not

properly before it, the court simplistically asserted that a better
education for limited English proficient children, was the purpose
behind the measure. 224
The district court's cursory analysis of whether the voters passed
Proposition 227 with a discriminatory intent deserves careful scrutiny.
1.

Factors in Discerning a "Discriminatory Intent"

The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis225 held that a discriminatory intent was necessary to establish an Equal Protection
violation. Although upholding a test used in hiring police officers
that had a disparate impact on African Americans, the Court emphasized that the "intent" requirement was not rigid:
[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevantfacts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not
infrequently true that the discriminatory impact .. .may for all
practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in
See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
"'

Id.

660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, ratified by the United States June
24, 1994; see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1998) (arguing that Convention bars
racial discrimination against "aliens" in immigration laws); Berta Esperanza HernndezTruyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International
Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare "Reform", 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 568-72
(1998) (discussing how various immigration and welfare "reform" laws violate Convention
and other international law).
Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
See id. ("[Als this court has already stated, the objective of both sides in this dispute is
the same - to educate all [limited English proficient] children.").
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to ex226
plain on nonracial grounds.
However, the Court stated unequivocally that impact alone is insufficient to establish an equal protection violation and speculated
that such a rule "would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory,
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and to the average black than to the more affluent white.'' 27
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that an Equal Protection
violation can be established with "proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivatingfactor in the decision. " 22s To make this
determination requires:
[A] sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
as may be available.... The impact of the action... may provide
an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, inexplicable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral
on its face. 2 9
Among the factors that the Court has found appropriate to consider in evaluating whether state action was motivated by an invidious intent is the "historical background," "[t] he specific sequence
of events leading up to the challenged decision," "[d]epartures
from the normal procedural sequence," and the "legislative or ad-

ministrative history."230 Importantly, "[h]istorical evidence is rele,,231
vant to a determination of discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 242 (emphasis added); seeReno v. Bossier, 520 U.S. 471, 489 (1997) ("The
important starting point for assessing discriminatory intent ...is the impact of the official
action whether it bears more heavily on one race than another.") (citations omitted) (quotation marks in original deleted).

Washington, 426 U.S. at 248.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (stating that discriminatory intent "implies that the
decisionmaker... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.") (footnote & citation
omitted).
M
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citing, inter alia,Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
Mo
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267, 269; see United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 747
(1992); see also Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995) (exploring such circumstances before finding that zoning decision was made without discriminatory
'7
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The discriminatory intent standard has proven to be a formidable barrier to an Equal Protection claim, although it is not impossible to satisf y.2 It historically has proven particularly difficult to
establish discriminatory motive when an institutional body made
the challenged decision. 3 Consequently, some critics claim that
initiatives, often legally bullet-proof, are especially damaging to
minority rights.

2

3

History supports this contention. 235

Not only

intent); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts,29 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 63 (1994) (advocating objective test of social meaning of discrimination that
considers multitude of factors).
21 Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1349 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (citing
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982)) (holding that Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors intended to discriminate against Hispanics in adopting redistricting scheme),
affd in part, vacated in part,918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
'2 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating Alabama constitutional provision disenfranchising certain convicted criminals because it was designed with
racial animus); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (finding that at-large electoral scheme
in Burke County, Georgia was maintained for discriminatory purposes); Castafieda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding that "key man" system for selection of grand juries proved
prima facie case of race discrimination in violation of Equal Protection Clause); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that "racial animus was a significant factor motivating" white residents who opposed low income housing
project), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th
Cir. 1982) (finding that city decision to effectively bar low income housing facility was motivated by discriminatory intent); see also Goosby v. Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that town maintained at-large voting scheme with discriminatory intent in
violation of Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause); cf State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d
886 (Minn. 1991) (invalidating state sentencing scheme under Minnesota Constitution
because of stark racial disparities in sentencing that resulted).
SeeJohnson, Immigration Politics, supra note 90, at 664-67; see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 46-47
(1988) (analyzing problems with determining "the motive of an institutional body comprising numerous decision makers"). See generallyJaneS. Schacter, The Pursuitof "PopularIntent":
InterpretiveDilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) (analyzing special difficulties discerning intent of voters in enacting initiatives).
See, e.g., Derrick A.'Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Eule, supra note 126, at 1553; Lazos, JudicialReview, supra note 10;
see also Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998)
(questioning whether initiatives, as popularly believed, allow voters to clearly express views);
Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government"?, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989) (contending that initiative lawmaking violates constitutional guarantee of republican form of government). For analysis of the initiative process, see PHIUIP L.
DUBOIS

&

FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS

(1998).
See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (invalidating as applied "alien land
law" passed by California voters designed to limit rights of persons of Japanese ancestry);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding unconstitutional initiative responding to immigration into Oregon of Catholics, who frequently attended parochial schools, by
requiring all children to attend public schools); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (striking
down law passed by Arizona voters barring certain employers from employing fewer than
80% "qualified electors or native born citizens").
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racial minorities, but other minorities may be adversely affected.
The initiative process effectively encourages voters to take out aggressions against an array of minority groups in a way that has become increasingly difficult to do in American political and community life. Indeed, one political scientist suggests that the increase in initiatives in California in the 1990s reflects the anxieties
of middle class whites and is linked to increasing minority representation in government.2 1 7 Such fear about these sorts of passions
swaying the political process help explain why the framers2 Mof the
Constitution opted for a representative form of government.
Because of the rigor of the "discriminatory intent" requirement,
some courts and advocates, as suggested by Valeria G., appear to
have shied away from Equal Protection challenges to invalidate
English-only laws passed by the voters in order to strike them down
on less demanding grounds. For example, the Arizona Supreme
Court invalidated an initiative that required government employees to speak only English on the job on First Amendment
grounds.3 9 Previously, a federal court of appeals had invalidated
the same law for similar reasons, 40 only to have the case dismissed
by the Supreme Court as moot 2 4 In so doing, the court of appeals
expressly acknowledged the national origin impacts of the Englishonly law.2 '2
' See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 670 (1996) (invalidating Colorado state constitutional amendment adopted by voters effectively repealing state and local provisions barring
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation); Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting challenge to voter-enacted city charter amendment barring "preferential treatment" for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals); see also Walter E. Adams, Jr.,
Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay
Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETrE L. RE',. 449 (1998) (analyzing adverse impact of initiative
process on lesbians and gay men).
2.1
See Bruce Cain, The Contemporary Context of Ethnic and Racial Politics in California, in
RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA 9,23-24 (Bryan O.Jackson & Michael B. Preston
eds., 1991).
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
also Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709,
723 (1994) (analyzing Madison's concerns in this regard).
' See Ruiz v. Hall, 191 Ariz. 441,957 P.2d 984 (1998) (invalidating Arizona English-only
law on First Amendment grounds).
. SeeYnigmez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
2'1
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); see also Cecilia
Wong, Comment, Language Is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English AfterYniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277 (1996) (analyzing First Amendment
reasoning of Ninth Circuit in Yniguez).
2"" SeeJohnson, Immigration Politics, supra note 90, at 670-71 (reviewing language in panel
opinion in Yniguez, which was never published after it was vacated, that"[s]ince language is a
close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of language may
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Discriminatory Intent and Proposition 227

Because the evidence establishes that race was "a motivating factor" 243 behind the passage of Proposition 227, the law violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 Language was employed as a proxy for race. Race, although not explicitly raised, can be seen by the near exclusive focus on the Spanish language, the history of discrimination against Mexican Americans in California, including the increase in anti-Latina/o and antiimmigrant animus in the 1990s, statements by the advocates of the
initiative, and the racially-polarized vote. Race obviously was "a
motivating factor" behind the passage of Proposition 227.
Ajudicial finding that Proposition 227 violates the Equal Protection Clause
would be consistent
with the landmark decision of
Brownv.
Bord
•245
Brown v. Board of Education. In Brown, ChiefJustice Warren wrote
that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [the] status
[of African Americans] in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 46 Proposition 227, by banning teaching in the native language of Spanish
speakers, creates a similar stigma for Latinas/os. It suggests that
Spanish and other languages are inferior to English and not fit for
247
education.
mask discrimination against specific national origin groups or, more generally, nativist sentiment.") (footnote omitted); Karla C. Robertson, Note, Out of Many, One: Fundamental
Rights, Diversity, and Arizona's English-Only Law, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 311, 329-32 (1996) (contending that Ninth Circuit should have invalidated Arizona law on Equal Protection, not
First Amendment grounds, because it discriminated on the basis of national origin).
2" Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 252
(1977).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 106-217. Similar arguments have
been made with
respect to other state action that disparately affects racial minorities. See, e.g., Jill E. Evans,
Challengingthe Racism in EnvironmentalRacism: Redefining the Concept ofIntent, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
1219, 1277-87 (1998) (stating how intent is difficult to prove in environmental racism cases).
M
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
216 Id. at 494; see Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle,90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1976) (discussing harmful effects of discrimination and segregation, including stigmatization of racial minorities).
2,1 See Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 UC DAVIS
L. REV.
503, 546-59 (1998) (contending that English-only movement and niles stigmatize Latinas/os
in the United States and help to ensure that they remain second class citizens); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1998) (stating, in regulation under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
that "[tihe primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic" and that suppression of language may "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation
and intimidation"); Jeffrey D. Kirtner, Comment, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective
in Title VII Claims, 73 TEX. L. REV. 871, 893-98 (1995) (identifying various harms to Latinas/os, including stigmatization, flowing from English-only rules in workplace).
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III. MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Mexican Americans and Latinas/os historically have suffered intentional discrimination in the state of California, as well as other
states.24 s Over the years, discriminators have used a number of
proxies, some more transparent than others, to discriminate
against Latinas/os. 49
The proxies for different minority groups may vary.25° For example, the "alien land" laws prevalent in many states early in the twentieth century discrimninated against persons of Japanese ancestry in
a facially neutral way by prohibiting real property ownership by
persons "ineligible to citizenship," at a time when Japanese were
the largest nonwhite immigrant group ineligible for naturalization.251 Opposition to low income housing in certain circumstances
may serve as cover for discrimination against African Americans. 52
In both instances, a proxy for race is employed to discriminate on
the basis of race. To this point, the Supreme Court has not generally analyzed the issue by utilizing the proxy concept. In applying
the antidiscrimination laws,
courts have held that an employer cannot be permitted to use a
technically neutral classification as a proxy to evade the prohibition of intentional discrimination. An example is using gray hair
as a proxy for age: there are young people with gray hair (a few),
but the fit between age and gray hair is sufficiently close that they
would form the basis for invidious classification.

In addition, Proposition 227 may ultimately have gender impacts that have been largely
ignored. Because women often are the primary childcare providers, they may have to deal
with children, who drop out of school due to the elimination of bilingual education. This
may exacerbate the poverty that currently exists among many single Latina mothers. See
Laura M. Padilla, Single-ParentLatinas on the Margin: Seeking a Room with a View, Meals, and
Built-In Community, 13 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 179, 197-206 (1998).
"
See supra text accompanying notes 16-105.
See, e.g., People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232 (1850) (rejecting claim that "foreign miners tax"
imposed on persons of Mexican ancestry violated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
See infra text accompanying notes 251-59.
See, e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925) (upholding California law); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding Washington law). See generally Keith
Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws"as a Prelude to Internment,
40 B.C. L. REv. 37 (1998) (analyzing history behind these laws and how they blazed a trail
forJapanese internment during World War II).
2
See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252.
" McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1992); see e.g., Slather v. Sather
Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Age discrimination may exist when an
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The Supreme Court has emphasized that an "employer cannot
rely on age as a proxy for... characteristics such as productivity"
24
and recognized that "[p]ension status may be a proxy for age." 5
Indeed, in Hunter v. Underwood,2" the Court understood that Alabama's constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted
of "any crime of moral turpitude" in effect served as a proxy for
race and therefore was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
Immigration status is often used in today's public discourse as a
proxy for race. 256 For example, attacks on "illegal aliens" often may
be used as a code, particularly in the Southwest, for Mexican immigrants and Mexican American citizens. 25 7' This is because Mexi-

can immigrants currently constitute about fifty percent of the undocumented population in the United States. 25 " Attacks on "illegal

aliens" therefore tend to be directed at Mexican immigrants. Similarly, efforts to deport "criminal aliens" or others who have violated
the criminal laws tend to adversely affect minority communities.
This is because, in the post-1965 period, most of the lawful immi-

employer terminates an employee based on a factor as a proxy for age.") (citation omitted);
Metz v. Transmit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that salary savings that
employers sought to realize by discharging older employee and replacing him with younger
one constituted age discrimination); Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc. 972 F. 2d
845, 851 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[Wlage discrimination can be a proxy for age discrimination, so
that lopping off high salaried workers can violate the" Age Discrimination in Employment
Act). Discrimination by proxy has been recognized in the scholarly literattire. Seesupranote
14 (citing authorities). One difficulty in application concerns the fact that some "classifications that correlate with race... may further permissible objectives because of that con-elation rather than despite it. Alexander & Cole, supra note 14, at 463. However, "irrational
proxy discrimination, based upon inaccurate stereotypes or generalizations is morally troublesome because it imposes unnecessary social costs." Alexander, supra note 14, at 169; see
also id. at 193 ("Proxy discrimination based upon inaccurate and usually bias-driven stereotyping are intrinsically immoral for the same reasons as are the biases with which they are
intimately linked.").
" Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993); see also Toni J. Querry, Note, A
Rose by Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet" DisparateTreatment Discriminationand the Age
Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 530 (1996) (analyzing
case law on age proxy doctrine).
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
21
See infra text accompanying notes 257-59.
" See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996-97); see also Ibrahim J. Gassama et al., Foreword: Citizenship and its Discontents: Centeringthe Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination (PartII), 76 OR. L. REv. 207, 217-19 (1997) (describing "nativistic racism" encountered by immigrants of color in United States).
"
See INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 137, at 199 (estimating that Mexico is
country of origin of 54% of undocumented immigrants in United States).
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grants have come from Asia and Latin America. 9 Thus, an attack
on the "criminal alien," and, similarly, the "alien" welfare abuser,
may translate into attacks on immigrants of color.
In the case of Proposition 227, voters discriminated against
Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants by proxy. Through
targeting language when the largest bilingual education programs
260
in California by far were for Spanish speakers, the initiative was
able to negatively affect a discrete and insular racial minority. 61 A
growing Latina/o population in the California public schools results in reduced financial support, a reduced commitment to bilingual education, and, ultimately to the prohibition of such education.26 2 Latinas/os were the known and actual victims. 2

63

A racially-

polarized vote confirmed that the measure used language as a
proxy for race.260
Current Equal Protection doctrine and the discriminatory intent
requirement, however, make it difficult for Latinas/os to establish
constitutional violations. Mexican Americans historically have
found it difficult to protect their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 For example, in Hernandez v. State,' 66 a Mexican American defendant challenged a murder

conviction on the ground that Mexican Americans had been excluded from serving on the jury. Hernandez relied on case law
holding that the government violated the Equal Protection Clause
by excluding African Americans from serving on juries. The Texas
Supreme Court, however, held that the Fourteenth Amendment
267
In this regard, the
exclusively protected African Americans.
See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at

'

the Immigration and NationalityAct of] 965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 276 (1996) (noting that, since
1965, 75% of immigrants to U.S. have come from Africa, Asia, and Latin America).
See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
6

See United States v. Carolene

Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4

(1938)

("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
See supra text accompanying notes 63-88.
See supratext accompanying notes 106-217.
See supratext accompanying notes 199-217.'
See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino CriticalScholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1189-92 (1997) (contending that cur-

rent interpretation of Equal Protection Clause produces inequality for Latinas/os);
Martinez, supranote 4 (to same effect).
251 S.W. 2d 531 (Tex. 1952).
See id. at 535.
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court held that Mexican Americans are "white." 26 Because the juries that indicted and convicted Hernandez were composed of
white persons and therefore members of his own race, the court
refused to find an Equal Protection violation.269
The Supreme Court reversed and held in Hernandez v. Texa 70
that the Equal Protection Clause covered "persons of Mexican descent." The Court, however, only extended a weak form of protection to Mexican Americans. The Fourteenth Amendment covered
Mexican Americans only in areas where they were the targets of
local discrimination.2 7' Thus, in areas where Mexican Americans
could not prove that they suffered from such discrimination, they
were not entitled to invoke the Equal Protection Clause. 72 Consequently, Mexican Americans found it difficult to assert rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, in part because they lacked funds to
satisfy the evidentiary burden of establishing the existence of local
prejudice.
The view that the Fourteenth Amendment only limited discrimination against African Americans may well be consistent with the
original understanding of its framers. As the Supreme Court in the
Slaughterhouse Cases explained:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the Reconstruction Amendments]; we mean
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman
and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him ....

The existence of laws in

the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which
discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a
class, was the evil to be remedied .... 274

Id.; see George A. Martfnez, PhilosophicalConsiderationsand the Use of Narrative in Law,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 686 (1999) (stating that Texas Supreme Court in Hernandez failed to
.recognize, harm [Mexican Americans] suffered from having no Mexican Americans on
juries.").
See Hernandez, 251 S.W. at 535.
',0 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
...See id. at 477-79.
" See Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class
Under Rule 23 and the EqualProtection Clause,50 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 395 (1975).
r"

See id. at 400-01.

"'

83 U.S.(16 Wall.) 36, 71-80 (1872).
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Indeed, the Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment dealt
exclusively with discrimination against African Americans: "We
doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of
their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this pro275

vision."

The idea that the structure of civil rights law historically fo.cused
on African Americans and Whites has been termed the "BlackWhite binary." 276 Although some argue that the Constitution must

be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the Framers,7 a
dualistic approach to antidiscrimination law is clearly outdated. As
famous sociologist Nathan Glazer has proclaimed, "[w]e are all
multiculturalists now."2 7 8 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained

in Missouri v. Holland that a constitutional issue "must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago ....
We must consider what the
country has become" in interpreting the Constitution. 279 Thus, the
...Id. at 81.
27

See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 265; see also Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez,

CrossoverDreams: The Roots of LatCrit Theoy in ChicanaloStudies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REV., 1143, 1157-59 (1999) (contending that studies of subordination of various
racial minority groups has long been established in ethnic studies scholarship); Mary Romero, Introduction, in CHALLENGING FRONTERAS: STRUCTURING LATINA AND LATINO LIVES IN
THE U.S. xiv (Mary Romero et al. eds., 1997) (criticizing "binary thinking of race relations in
this country [that] is so ingrained in the dominant culture that it continues to shape what we
see.").
211 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITIAL SEDUCTION
OF
THE LAW 159 (1990).
27
See NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now (1997); see also Kevin R.
Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challengesfor the Latino Community in the Twenty-First
Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 64-66 (1995) (analyzing complexities of modern race relations,
including many groups besides African Americans and whites); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical

Race Praxis:Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Praxis in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 821 (1997) (analyzing interracial conflict arising in impact litigation).
'
252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). Holmes, viewed by many as "a legal icon in the history
of American legal thought," Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From
Langdell to Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 361 (1994), rejected formalistic
approaches to law in favor of a jurisprudence that took account of human experience and
social need. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)("[T]he felt
necessities ... and the intuitions of public policy ... have had a good deal more to do... in
determining the rules by which men should be governed."). Professor Paul Brest wrote that:
According to the political theory most deeply rooted in the American tradition,
the authority of the Constitution derives from the consent of its adopters. Even if
the adopters freely consented to the Constitution, however, this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the founding document, for their consent
alone cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt the Constitution
and those who did are dead and gone.
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courts should interpret the Equal Protection Clause in a way to
fully protect Mexican Americans and other minority groups as well
as African Americans and whites.
Some contend that efforts to expand beyond the Black-White dichotomy are "reactionary."2

80

However, a Black-White view of the

Fourteenth Amendment seems to have been the position of its
framers. Interpreting the Constitution by focusing on the framers'
intent is traditionally viewed as a conservative position."' Moving
to a multiracial approach to reflect our changing society represents
a proper modem interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The expansion of the law's protection raises a number of difficult issues. As we progress historically away from the hey-day ofJim
Crow, racial discrimination ordinarily is no longer as blatant and
obvious as it once was.282 With respect to Latinas/os, discrimination is often conducted by proxy - targeting characteristics such
as the Spanish language, as a surrogate for discriminating against
Latinas/os. To provide legal protection to Latinas/os, and in order to keep pace with the changing nature of racial discrimination,
the Fourteenth Amendment must be interpreted in a way to cover
discrimination by proxy.
Ultimately, interpreting the Constitution in a way that is sensitive
to discrimination by proxy would benefit all minority groups.
Various subordinated peoples - African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Latinas/os, women, lesbians, gay men, and
others8 3 - are discriminated against through different proxies. As
sociologists have recognized, appeals to "law and order" and for a

Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 224
(1980).
Anthony Paul Farley, All Flesh Shall See It Together, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REV. 163,
171 (1998).
' See, e.g., BORK, supra note 277, at 143 ("In the legal academies in particular, the philosophy of original understanding is usually viewed as thoroughly pass6, probably reactionary, and certainly the most dreaded indictment of all - outside the mainstream").
. See John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The FairHousing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1998) ("[Racism] introduces itself anew and covertly to the
breadth of contemporary institutions, culture, and society. This advanced, insidious racism
operates so effectively that we seldom distinguish serious racist harms from a variety of other
harms that categorically run from 'bad luck' to 'natural catastrophes.'").
' See, e.g., Darren L. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and PoliticalDiscourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 636-41 (1999) (discussing connections between race, gender, and sexuality); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructingthe Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American
Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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minorreturn to "traditional" values can "effectively remarginalize
28 1
race.
ity cultures without ever expressly invoking issues of

Once this is considered, to demand that plaintiffs establish discriminatory intent

-

that is, some secret racist mental state -

to

establish unlawful race discrimination appears incoherent. Legal
theorists who have investigated the "grammar" of the term "intent"
have shown that when referring to intent, one does not seek to
describe a mental event, " 5 but is simply asking for ajustification for
"fishy or untoward actions."2 " The Supreme Court was mistaken to
require plaintiffs to establish intent as a prerequisite for proving an
Equal Protection violation. In so doing, the Court saddled racial
minorities with an incoherent, often impossible task.
Moreover, it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to establish
the intent requirement. As the Court itself emphasized in Brown v.
Board ofEducation, "[s] egregation is unconstitutional not because it
is intended to hurt blacks but because, whatever its intent, it relegates them as a group to a permanently subservient position."2

7

As

many have argued, this anticaste principle deserves greater valence
in constitutional analysis.
CONCLUSION

This Article contends that Proposition 227, and possibly related
measures, discriminates against persons of Mexican ancestry in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. California's history, together with the text of the
initiative, the arguments of the proponents, the campaign, and the'

true.2W
racially polarized election results, all demonstrate this to be

6, at 123-128.
See Daniel Yeager, A Plea for "A Plea for Excuses": Exculpation and the Explication of

OMI & WINANT, supra note

Responsibility 14-15 (unpublished manuscript on file with authors); see also Paul ]. Gudel,
Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 80, 84-85 (1991); note 10 (citing authorities criticizing

discriminatory intent standard).
Yeager, supra note 285, at 15-16.
z
Louis M. SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIE: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 105 (1996); see also OWEN FISS, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: TlE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 3-21 (1999)

(contending that judiciary

should invalidate laws, such as limits on benefit eligibility, making immigrants "pariahs");
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The PariahPrinciple,13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257 (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anti-Caste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
.8 See Sunstein, supranote 287.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-228.
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If the analysis is less than persuasive, then one must question the
"discriminatory intent" requirement itself. Its coherence is far
from clear when hundreds of thousands of voters cast ballots and
discerning an "intent" is less real than imaginary. Like other discriminatory measures of the past,2 history books will record
Proposition 227's discrimination by proxy as race-based. 9I One
worries when legal doctrine requires the difficult efforts at historical reconstruction of "intent" as seen in this Article. Legal doctrine
that obscures social reality ultimately loses credibility. One almost
feels like philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein upon completion of his
monumental tract:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -

as steps -

to climb up be-

yond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it).... He must transcend these propositions and
then he will see the world aright.

See generaly Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can FreeExpression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1992).
" History already is recording the many initiatives passed by California voters as a response to the increased minority population in the state.

See generally PETER SCHRAG,
(making this argu-

PARADISE LOST, CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE (1998)

ment).
m

LUDWIG WITTGENsTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHIcus 74 (trans. D.F. Pears &

B.F. McGuinnes, 1961).

